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ABSTRACT 
 
Inductive Causation on Strategic Behavior: The Case of Retailer 
 and Manufacturer Pricing. (December 2009) 
Francisco Fraire Domínguez, B.S.; M.S. Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores 
de Monterrey 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David J. Leatham 
 
 Models of strategic behavior are usually too complex to conduct large scale 
analyses, and frequently rely on accurate descriptions of the strategic environment, or 
unrealistic assumptions which render empirical studies very sensitive to 
misspecification. This dissertation relates game-theoretic frameworks to models of 
causality inference and thus provides a reliable method to identify price leadership. 
Therefore, causal models can be used to study large sets of data without imposing 
strategic behavior a priori. 
   A case study is provided by analyzing the supply chain relationship among 
Dominick’s Finer Foods and its suppliers. Although our data required aggregation, this 
empirical analysis successfully determined causal patterns for 60% of our sample. Of 
these price leaderships, 70% elicit Manufacturer Stackelberg relationships which tend to 
be associated with manufacturers that hold big market shares, 25% elicit Retailer 
Stackelbergs which seem to be associated with the biggest retailer margin profits, and 
 iv 
only 5% elicit a monopolistic retailer with vertical coordination. These results agree with 
observations made by other authors and the market structure of the 1990’s. 
  Moreover, the strategic relationship among the suppliers is also studied. 
Interestingly, the dominant firms tend to isolate themselves from the price leadership, 
whereas the second largest firms seem to become price leaders. Our studies agree with 
the market literature as well. In particular, we find price leadership in a firm which was 
identified as a low cost leader. Finally, we discovered that the private label does not lead 
any firm’s price unless this firm is the provider of a generic brand. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The search for above normal performance by firms in competitive environments 
leads to the use of strategic behavior. Since different strategies lead to different 
distribution of profits, the analysis of strategic relationships has caught the attention of 
both academics and practitioners. This research studies the use of causal inference 
models to uncover strategic behavior among competing firms. This is important because 
proper determination of a strategic relationship has been found to be essential for 
accurate modeling. Moreover, models of strategic behavior are usually too complex to 
conduct large scale analyses. This dissertation thus explains how the usual game 
theoretic frameworks imply different causal patterns and therefore can be elicited 
through models of causal inference. Thereafter, we apply this methodology to analyze 
both the horizontal relationship among several manufacturers, and their vertical 
relationship with a retailer. 
 This study addresses a common question. Simply put, who sets the price of a 
product?  The right answer is it depends. On one hand, demand is determined by 
consumers’ preferences, the variety and relationships among their feasible alternatives, 
and their current and expected income. On the other hand, supply is determined not only 
by the scarcity of the resources being used, but also by the possibility of new entrants, 
the existence of competitors, the relationships among them, and their relationships with 
________________________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Management Science. 
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their supply chains. Consequently, different environments lead to different solutions. For 
these reasons, researchers specify complex models that try to include all these factors. 
But the level of their complexity increases with their degree of comprehensiveness, 
which makes estimation of the underlying structure very difficult. 
 Indeed, complex models bring along another problem. As we will discuss later, 
our use of econometric models reminds us of the observer’s effect often discussed in 
experimental science; it appears that the specification of structural models tends to 
influence the results that we obtain. Therefore, this research studies a different approach 
to observe the strategic relationships between firms. Such behavior has been long 
analyzed under the microscope of Game Theory. And, although several avenues of 
investigation have been used, proper identification remains a problem. Who sets the 
price? Is there a first mover whose actions ripple across other firms? Or is it that, when 
the equilibrium is disturbed, all prices just bounce up and down until a new equilibrium 
is reached? Are these relationships present within a supply chain? Further, does the 
pricing relationship between the retailer and the supplier change with different products? 
 Several different methods have been designed to gain insights in market power 
and strategic behavior. For example, New Empirical Industrial Organization 
(Appelbaum, 1979), Solow Residual estimation of market power (Raper, Love, 
Shumway, 2007), Models of Discrete Games (Bresnahan and Reiss 1990, 1991), non 
parametric methods (Ashenfelter and Sullivan, 1987), and many other clever 
configurations are either used to determine the degree of departure from perfect 
competition, or the nature of the underlying strategic game such as the presence of a 
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price leader, or simultaneous movers. But each of these methodologies comes at a price. 
Different assumptions regarding the technology, costs, structure, or even the game itself, 
must be imposed which greatly complicate the estimation. Here, we identify the game, 
per se, with the use of Directed Graphs (DGs) by associating their causal patterns with 
those implied by Nash equilibriums.  
 In the following section, the problem to be analyzed and the dissertation 
objectives are stated. We review in Section 3 the most common techniques employed to 
address these objectives, and explain how our methodology offers useful advantages 
over them. Thereafter, the theoretical framework often used and how it implies the 
causal relationships that we elicited, is discussed in Section 4. We present in Section 5 
an application of our study to the analysis of strategic behavior within a supply chain, 
and also learn the relationship among the suppliers of a single retailer.  Finally, a 
summary, conclusions, and suggestions for future research are provided in Section 6. 
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2. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 The difficulty of acquiring profits has led to the study of strategic behavior in 
competitive environments. Although the theoretical framework has long been 
established, the empirical models still need to catch up.  This is because the models of 
strategic behavior are usually too complex to conduct large scale analyses, or they rely 
on accurate descriptions of the strategic environment, which may lead to 
misspecification.  Indeed, the complexities of the analytical solutions make it infeasible 
to jointly study more than a few products, firms, or industries.  
 For instance, the Lee and Staelin (1997) study of strategic behavior in supply 
chains mentions the need for models that include all the dimensions of competition; 
horizontal and vertical at every level (manufacturer-manufacturer, retailer-retailer, and 
manufacturer-retailer). The authors wondered if some of their results are theoretical 
possibilities only.  
 Another example is provided by Stockton, Capps, and Bessler (2008). They used 
causal models to examine Samuelson’s mixed demand systems, which imply that prices 
exogenously determine the quantities for some goods, while the opposite is true for other 
commodities. Thus, it would be interesting to reexamine Samuelson’s duality from a 
strategic perspective. 
 The objective of this study is to relate models of causality inference to the 
framework used to study strategic behavior. Connecting the two frameworks enables us 
to characterize strategic competition and understand how pricing policies are being 
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implemented. This is important for several reasons. First, accurate predictions are 
imperative for the advancement of research. Specific knowledge of the underlying 
strategic relationship is therefore essential for an accurate specification of structural 
models. Second, large scale studies are necessary for the achievement of robust 
conclusions. But the usual structural models are impractical in this setting. Nevertheless, 
causal models are algorithms that can be automated and thus facilitate the analysis of 
large datasets. We accomplished these objectives by revisiting the game theory analysis 
of strategic behavior (Nash equilibriums of the Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand 
games), and its implications on causal models. We programmed the PC Algorithm 
(Sprites et al., 1993), Moneta’s Algorithm (Moneta, 2008), and Richardson’s Algorithm 
(Richardson, 1996) into a spreadsheet and conducted an empirical study that provides 
support to our theoretical findings. 
 The results of this research have important applications for practitioners as well. 
Strategic decision making requires an accurate description of the business environment 
before any strategies are pursued. Therefore, observing the actual pricing policies is 
important because competitors’ optimal responses should not be assumed nor expected a 
priori (Lee and Staelin, 1997; Gibbons, 1992). 
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3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The analysis of price movements is interesting per se. The movements are not 
only reflections of supply and demand shocks and changes, but also consequences from 
strategic interactions between firms trying to secure a higher level of profits. This 
research studies the later. Firms’ engagements into tacit or explicit agreements have 
produced a vast array of significant research, whether those strategies are of a horizontal 
(among competitors), or vertical (within a supply chain) nature. 
 We revisit in this section the literature that has addressed strategic behavior with 
the use of empirical models. It is introduced in Subsection 3.1 our review by discussing 
the different complexities found when eliciting strategic behavior in horizontal 
competition. We move on to Subsection 3.2 to explain how these problems are also 
present when studying vertical competition. Throughout, we describe how some of these 
problems can be addressed by identifying the kind of strategic interaction beforehand. 
Our discussion ends by proposing the use of Directed Graphs for that purpose. Although 
Directed Graphs have not been used in a similar setting, we review their use by 
economists in Subsection 3.3. 
 
3.1 EMPIRICAL MODELS OF HORIZONTAL COMPETITION 
 Many different model configurations have been created to elicit strategic 
relationships. The most used framework was provided by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 
1991) and Reiss (1996), which allows estimating structural models that describe 
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simultaneous-move, sequential-move, and cooperative equilibriums. Their equations are 
thus used to describe the equilibrium which strongly depends on the specification of the 
game structure. This approach has since been extended to systems that study several 
different scenarios. For example, Slade (1992) analyzed a dynamic environment with the 
purpose of eliciting the slopes of inter temporal response functions. In this case, the 
Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960; Kalman and Bucy 1961) is the estimation technique used 
to identify the strategic behavior observed in Vancouver, British Columbia during 
gasoline-price wars. 
 Slade (1992) emphasized the need for data that covers periods with demand 
shocks, so the actual strategies being used can be observed. She also stressed the need of 
highly disaggregated data. She assumed symmetrical firms with differentiated products 
and identical marginal costs. But most importantly, she assumed that the observed price 
summarizes all its previous history. In other words, she assumes a Markov process 
where the response functions take the form of the expected drift. That expected drift is 
the one that describes the underlying game ranging from a perfect collusive behavior to a 
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. 
 In an earlier paper, Slade (1990) considered several different models used to 
analyze games. These models assume infinitely repeated games with discounted future 
benefits embedded in the current payoff. She also focused her attention in periods of 
time where disequilibrium can be observed. Although her objectives were different from 
her 1992 paper, she emphasized that an accurate model specification is crucial. Such 
specification should include the choice of punishment for the cheater, the nature of the 
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shocks that disturb the system, and what is assumed to be common knowledge to all 
parties.    
 Imposing the wrong environment on a model can lead to misspecification. As an 
example, Carter et al. (1997) argued that although only quantity-setting strategies are 
usually studied (since they escape the Bertrand paradox), such behavior should not be 
assumed a priori. Especially when differentiated products are being studied (Wolak and 
Kolstad, 1991). Indeed, removing restrictive assumptions is important, but difficult to 
successfully implement. Carter et al. analyzed the Japanese market for imported beef. 
They applied the methodology introduced by Gasmi et al. (1992) which consists in 
specifying different game structures and then evaluating which one best explains the 
observed data. In particular, Bertrand and Stackelberg price-based models, and quantity-
based Cournot and Stackelberg models are used. First order conditions are taken on 
these specifications and then estimated as systems of equations. The model which 
provides the best statistical fit, is the one assumed to uncover the actual firms’ behavior. 
 Aradillas-Lopez (2005)  discussed a downside of this methodology.  He argued 
that the assumption of complete knowledge of the other player’s behavior, as well as 
economic fundamentals, will result in multiple equilibriums, which may be consistent 
with different model parameterizations. Ardillas-Lopez (2005) revisited Bresnahan and 
Reiss (1990, 1991) but avoids the complete-information assumption by allowing an 
environment in which the players observe a noisy signal of the game’s realized payoff 
structure. Thereafter, the agents maximized their expected utility conditioned on 
imperfect information and achieved a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. An a priori nature of 
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the game was not assumed. Although this approach does not make inferences on the 
nature of the game, it does emphasize that different game specifications can achieve 
similar results when multiple equilibriums are allowed, making it harder to accurately 
identify the type of strategies employed by the firms. Other authors have also paid 
attention to multiple equilibriums and incomplete information. Bajari et al. (2004) 
provided a simulation-based approach that determines the probability of achieving 
particular equilibrium points. Tamer (2003) used restrictions on the probability of the 
non unique outcomes to demonstrate that multiplicity of equilibriums can be exploited to 
achieve gains in efficiency.  
 There is another downside of the Gasmi et al. (1992) methodology. Dhar, 
Chavas, Cotterill, and Gould (2005) considered the leading brands sold by PepsiCo. and 
Coca-Cola looking for market structure and strategic pricing to study strategic games 
with multiple firms that promote multiple brands. The authors discussed that the accurate 
specification of the model is crucial, and misspecification can lead to spurious results. 
They argued that the main weakness of specifying profit-maximizing first-order 
conditions under the assumptions of Bertrand, Cournot, or Stackelberg games, relies on 
the simplified demand specifications used. They addressed this problem by using a fully 
flexible nonlinear almost ideal demand system (AIDS) and later derived the 
corresponding first order conditions to be estimated with full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML). They advocated the use of this methodology with the use of multiple 
products and multiple firms. However, they do not find evidence that supported either 
the Nash-Bertrand or the Stackelberg equilibrium in their sample.  
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 Some interesting thoughts come also from the study of Dhar et al. (2005). The 
authors indicated that, although the same manufacturer can provide several different 
brands, each of them can be marketed differently. This is because the manufacturer may 
be the provider of a brand that dominates one segment of the market, but not be the 
provider of the dominating brands in different segments
1
. This is of particular interest for 
this dissertation. Since the structural model has to be carefully specified, it is not by any 
means intuitive to determine the structure of the game a priori. A firm may have a 
Stackelberg leading brand in one segment of the market, but a Stackelberg follower 
brand in a different segment of the market. They may also engage in collusive behavior 
for some brands, but in non cooperative competition in others.  
 
3.2 EMPIRICAL MODELS OF VERTICAL COMPETITION 
 The above comments also apply to the analysis of vertical competition. Indeed, 
when supply chain members are independent decision makers, there are incentives to 
improve individual performance (Leng and Parlar, 2005). This results in an environment 
where a great array of strategies is pursued by firms, not only to influence the 
distribution of profits, but to change their power within the supply chain as well 
(Kadiyali, Chintagunta, Vilcassim, 2000). Therefore, game theory has also been used to 
analyze the relationship between retailers and manufacturers. Leng and Parlar (2005) 
published a very comprehensive review of more than 130 papers and classified the 
papers according their application areas, and although not all of them refer to pricing 
                                                 
1
 Thanks to Whitney Bessler for her valuable insights. 
2
 By ―causality‖ we mean that  if xi can be manipulated by changing xj, then xj causes xi. In a graphical 
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schemes but contracts designs, most of them imply Nash (simultaneous moves) and 
Stackelberg equilibriums (Figure 1). As we explained above, the estimation of structural 
models becomes increasingly difficult. We will discuss below that a detailed 
characterization of the (assumed) competing environment is also required to customize 
the models, i.e., the number of retailers and manufacturers, the type of interaction among 
manufacturers and retailers, the  effect of one manufacturer actions on other 
manufacturers, etc. 
 There are many papers that directly addressed the manufacturer-retailer strategic 
behavior by using tailored made models. Jørgensen (1986) analyzed optimal production 
and pricing policies of a manufacturer, whereas the retailer also wanted to determine 
optimal purchasing quantities and pricing policies. The problem was considered in a 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Topical Classification of Game Theoretic Studies of Supply Chain 
Management. (Leng and Parlar, 2005) 
 
1. Inventory games with fixed unit purchase cost. 
2. Inventory games with quantity discounts. 
3. Production and pricing competition. (Vertical competition between the retailer 
and manufacturers). 
4. Games with other attributes. 
a. Capacity decisions. 
b. Service quality. 
c. Product quality. 
d. Advertising and new product introduction. 
5. Games with joint decisions on inventory, production/pricing and other attributes. 
a. Joint inventory and production/pricing decisions. 
b. Joint inventory and capacity decisions. 
c. Joint production/pricing and capacity decisions. 
d. Joint production/pricing and service/product quality decisions. 
e. Joint production/pricing and advertising/new product introduction 
decisions. 
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continuous time setting and the complexity of its solutions derived from the use of 
differential game theory. McGuire and Staelin (1983) assumed static linear demands and 
cost functions to generate a system of equations that were later used to examine the 
effect of product substitutability on the way manufacturers distribute them. Once again, 
the business environment was highly specified. The retailer marketed only the good 
provided by the manufacturer such as car dealerships, gas stations, etc. Or a large 
wholesaler distributed only through a single retailer like Sears. These assumptions 
facilitated the generation of a model where manufacturers maximized profits in different 
scenarios of competitive behavior with different reaction functions both from competing 
manufacturers and retailers. 
 Choi (1991) studied Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums to analyze the 
competition problem between two competing manufacturers and a common retailer. 
Once again a system of equations was used to estimate the optimal behavior under very 
specific assumptions about how manufacturers and retailers behaved. In particular, Choi 
assumed that manufacturers had the same relationship with the retailer (Nash or 
Stackelberg in the same direction), while they hold a Bertrand-type competition among 
them. Choi noted that his results were greatly influenced by the specification of the 
demand function (linear Vs non-linear). Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim (2000) 
extended Choi’s results to measure how profits are distributed within the channel and 
how this depended on demand factors, costs factures, and the strategic behavior. In this 
research, a continuum of equilibriums is allowed instead of restraining to the three types 
estimated by Choi.  
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 Chiang and Hess (2003) also specified a profit maximizing system to analyze 
strategic behavior within a supply chain. They a priori set a Stackelberg strategy where 
the manufacturer was the leader. Their aim was to analyze the effect of a direct channel 
of distribution on the manufacturer’s profits. They found that when the manufacturer and 
the retailer act independently, the equilibriums yield a higher price with lower sales and 
lower profits. When the manufacturer can sell its product directly to the consumer, a 
credible threat is generated that results in lower prices offered by the retailer and 
thereafter increasing demand for the product.  
 Identification of the equilibrium type is important in all these studies because 
different degrees of complexity are uncovered when specifically looking at the 
relationship between a retailer and a supplier. For instance, Martın-Herran, Taboubi, 
Zaccour (2006) tried to identify the optimal shelf-space allocation of products. They 
explicitly assumed a Stackelberg game between two manufacturers and a retailer. The 
manufacturers were the first movers whereas the retailer was the follower. Both 
manufacturers set their wholesale prices using the retailer’s shelf space as second 
mover’s reaction function. But they did not engage explicitly in a game with their 
competitor. 
 The problem just described provides another lesson. The relationship among 
manufacturers is as important as the relationship with the retailer, which also leads to 
strategic behavior. Although it is more frequently assumed that the manufacturer is the 
leader in the Stackelberg game (Wang, 2002; Corbett et al., 2004), there are several 
studies that challenge this assumption and analyze the possibility of a simultaneous 
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moves. Chu and Messinger (1997) and others assumed that the retailer is the first mover 
(Choi, 1991; Tsay, 2002; Ertek and Griffin, 2002).  But once again, no attempts are 
made to identify the true nature of the game.  
 Our problem relates very strongly to the one examined by Lau et al. (2007). 
Given a demand for a product and the cost of producing it, both the retailer and the 
manufacturer set their prices. Since the cost of producing the good is not known by the 
retailer, a bargaining process should start so as to get the lowest price possible from the 
manufacturer. Lau et al. considered how a dominant retailer should operate when there is 
no knowledge of the manufacturer’s costs. This retailer, optimizes with only two 
available strategies; a Stackelberg game where the retailer is the first mover, or a 
Stackelberg game where the manufacturer is the first mover. Lau et al. find it optimal to 
design a ―reverse quantity discount‖ scheme offered by the retailer to the manufacturer. 
But once again, a Stackelberg game is assumed a priori. Indeed, such assumption makes 
sense for powerful retailers as Wal-Mart or outsourcing manufacturers. But what about 
retailers that are not as powerful or manufacturers that have even more power?  
 Our problem also relates to Choi (1991) who analyzed the effect of an 
intermediary on the competing behavior between manufacturers. He found 
counterintuitive results that imply that a manufacturer should do business with an 
exclusive retailer, whereas the retailer should work with several manufacturers. Also, he 
found that channel members’ profits and prices are increased as products are less 
differentiated. A large empirical study would provide with a more robust analysis. But a 
large empirical study has not been conducted because of the hardship required to specify 
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an accurate system. Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim (2000) worked on Choi’s 
findings and provided a more general system, but acknowledged that a system of 
equations is very sensitive to misspecification. 
 Lee and Staelin (1997) also studied the interactions between manufacturers and 
retailers. Their study directly addressed the determination of the optimal pricing margin 
as a response to a change in margin by another member of the supply chain. They 
demonstrate that the optimal pricing policy, to increase or decrease their margin, is 
closely related to the level of demand at a given price, and the convexity of the demand 
function. Therefore, they suggest that the linear (LAIDS) or nonlinear (LAIDS) 
specification of the demand in the structural models is not as important as determining 
the type of interaction present between the channel members. This is because the 
members of a supply chain do not always behave optimally. Therefore, the choice of a 
firm’s optimal strategy is not constrained by the best response of the channel member, 
but by the actual response being observed. Indeed, Dhar et al.  (2005) assumed a fixed 
markup as the retailer strategy, but they also acknowledge that studies of this nature (that 
assume that retailers do not engage in strategic behavior) will be biased. For this reason 
they recommend studying this problem with store level data and information on 
manufacturers-retailers contracts (a natural extension for our study as well). 
 But it seems that the study of strategic interactions is incomplete if only one 
dimension is addressed. In other words, vertical and horizontal coordination depend on 
characteristics of both vertical and horizontal industries, and failure to explicitly 
consider one dimension when studying the other could lead to inaccurate conclusions 
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(Lee and Staelin, 1997).  Moreover, the Folk Theorems imply the existence of more 
equilibriums when firms engage in a repeated game (Friedman, 1971). This supports Lee 
and Staelin (1997) call for improvements in modeling, by including credible threats and 
punishment strategies to study stability of stage strategies. 
 Furthermore, Lee and Staelin (1997) argued that the stability of Stackelberg 
strategy is debatable when the retailer is the leader. This is because the game occurs in 
stages, where in the first one, the leader chooses its strategy based on the second mover’s 
best response. So, the retailer would announce its margin strategy and let the 
manufacturer set his strategy as a response. But once the retailer owns the product, the 
retailer might choose a different margin from the one that was previously announced to 
the manufacturer. Therefore, Lee and Staelin (1997) suggest that a pre-commitment is 
required to restrict deviations from the equilibrium, which is enforced through 
punishment strategies and credible threats. We agree on the need for punishment 
strategies and credible threats to ensure the stability of equilibriums, but we conclude 
that the retailer would not find it on its best interest to deviate, since a proper pricing 
policy should be time consistent. Actually, it is the consistency of the strategies which 
allow us to use the causal models. Once the manufacturer chooses his margin, the 
retailer’s best response should stay the same. A review of the use of causal models in 
economics follows. We conclude by explaining how these models are used in this 
research. 
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3.3 CAUSAL MODELS 
 Causal models are a research technique which identifies variables that can be 
manipulated by changing other variables. Although they are used extensively by 
statisticians, their use has been limited in the fields of economics, industrial 
organization, marketing, and management. Directed Graphs (DGs) allow us to stand as 
mere observers of price and quantities movements without assuming a priori any 
underlying game. This methodology can be used to observe the statistical properties of 
price movements and provide a simplified description of a joint probability function, 
useful to determine causality among variables (Frydenberg, M., 1990).  Therefore, once 
two economic agents engage in a repeated game, such causality in price movements 
elicits the strategic behavior.  
 Causality between variables is inferred by taking a detailed look at correlations 
and partial correlations
2
. We can deduce that a change in one variable can be used to 
manipulate others if the correlation between two variables disappears (or appears) when 
conditioned on a third variable. This is because given a set of variables X = {x1, x2,..., xn}  
with a joint probability density function Pr[x1, x2,..., xn], the probability function of xi 
conditional on subsets of X can be obtained. Thereafter, the traditional definition of 
probabilistic independence can be used to infer causality among them and create graphs 
as an efficient representation of the underlying probability distributions. The variables 
are then charted with directed connectors to indicate a causal path, which in our context 
elicits a first mover in price setting. There are several computer algorithms that achieve 
                                                 
2
 By ―causality‖ we mean that  if xi can be manipulated by changing xj, then xj causes xi. In a graphical 
representation we have xj →xi. 
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this purpose. Those algorithms that proved to be the most useful for this research will be 
described in detail. 
 As we mentioned before, the use of DGs has not been applied in strategic 
behavior analysis, but has been used in the field of economics. Bessler and Kergna 
(2002) used graphs that do not allow for recursive patterns,  Directed Acyclic Graphs 
(DAGs), along with error correction models, to analyze how price information is 
discovered in one market and then transferred to others. They address questions very 
similar to ours but in a different environment. Specifically, they studied which markets 
set prices and how that information is then transferred to other markets.  
 Bessler and Yang (2003) applied the same methodology to analyze the structure 
of interdependence in international stock markets. They wondered if there are stock 
markets whose prices move before the rest, revealing a causal information flow among 
them. Bessler and Yang discussed that the recognition of non-stationarity of stock prices 
had induced a search for long term relationships through cointegration analysis. But 
previous studies usually failed to address the contemporaneous relationships among the 
stock markets. Specifically, Bessler and Yang questioned if innovations in a market had 
a causal relationship with other markets. They removed the estimated structure from the 
observed price data so innovations can be uncovered. These innovations were later 
examined with the use of DAGs which graphically showed the causality patterns that 
needed to be imposed on the impulse response functions.  
 Moneta (2008) used the same methodology to revisit the business cycle 
hypothesis. He introduced several small modifications to the PC algorithm which 
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resulted in a more conservative analysis, but more precise DAGs too. In particular, his 
algorithm tests each relationship under more conditioning tests and uses a very data 
specific test (a Wald statistic), whereas PC relies on an asymptotic normal distributed 
statistic. In our context, we want to study how the information is transferred horizontally 
among manufacturers and vertically among manufacturers and retailers. 
 We will have one important difference from the methodology introduced by 
Bessler and later used by Moneta. Bessler was concerned with finding a 
contemporaneous causality pattern among the researched variables, whereas the 
dynamics were analyzed through other methodologies such as the impulse-response 
functions (Swanson and Granger, 1997). Therefore, the residuals of the estimated Error 
Correction Model (ECM) where used as inputs for the DAG algorithm. Here, we care 
about the dynamics per se and therefore we do not need to estimate an ECM as Bessler 
did, nor a VAR as in Moneta’s study. Stationary series (by taking differences or 
differences of the logarithms of the original series) are all we need  to avoid finding 
spurious relationships (Bessler and Kling, 1984)
3
. Thus, we started by analyzing the 
stationarity of the prices with Dickey Fuller tests and then transformed the data when 
required. These were later fed into the algorithms that create the DGs. Specifically, we 
used a truncated version of Richardson’s Directed Cyclic Graphs algorithm (Richardson 
1996) and Moneta’s Algorithm, as well. However, we used the original Fisher statistic 
                                                 
3
 Bessler and Kling showed that wrong relationships can be inferred if the order of integration is ignored. 
They demonstrated their point by demonstrating (what is obviously false) that the US GDP causes 
sunspots, if proper treatment of integration properties are ignored. 
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given that the Wald test proposed by Moneta is not required here because we are not 
using the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR innovations as inputs.  
 We have discussed the literature in this section and we concluded that the use of 
causal models will allow us to study strategic interactions between firms from an 
observer’s point of view. Causal models not only allow us to study pricing behavior 
without a priori imposing any structure in the relationship between the analyzed firms, 
but also permit the study of large datasets and several firms at the same time. This is 
imperative for robust results. The pricing behavior is explained by the usual models of 
strategic behavior which are reviewed in the next section. We provide an empirical case 
study in Section 5. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
 We have discussed that the analysis of strategic behavior has been constrained by 
the complexity of the systems that have to be estimated. Research conclusions tend to be 
sensitive to misspecification, and broader and more robust studies are usually 
encouraged by the literature. Therefore, this research extends the use of causal models to 
the study of strategic behavior. To achieve this purpose, we  now revisit the analysis of 
pricing strategies through the game theory framework, and explain how its findings 
relate to the one used for causality inference.  
 We start by discussing in Subsection 4.1 the analysis of Nash equilibriums of 
firms engaged in horizontal competition (Manufacturer-Manufacturer) in a static 
environment. Then, we discuss how this framework is extended to a dynamic setting by 
assuming that each of the static processes are repeated continuously in a recurring 
relationship. We proceed to extend this framework to that of vertical competition 
(Manufacturer-Retailer) in Subsection 4.2. Thereafter, in Subsection 4.3, we present the 
algorithms used in this dissertation after discussing the implications of the Nash 
equilibriums on causal patterns. An empirical application of these concepts is offered in 
Section 5. 
 
4.1 THEORETICAL MODEL: HORIZONTAL COMPETITION 
 We reviewed the literature in the previous section and discussed how strategic 
behavior in price settings has been analyzed with the use of game theory. We concluded 
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that industrial organization research has found it difficult to empirically observe and 
quantify the effects predicted by the theoretic models. This is because of the complexity 
of the systems that have to be estimated and the assumptions that have to be imposed on 
those models. Particularly, specifying the underlying game is fundamental for accurate 
predictions. This dissertation studies the use of causality models to identify the nature of 
the strategic relationships. Therefore, the theoretical models are now discussed, and how 
their results imply a causal relationship that can be detected by our methodology. 
 In this section, we link the classic horizontal strategic games to the causal graphs. 
Horizontal games describe scenarios where firms choose their prices or levels of 
production based on information collected from their competitors. We start by 
specifying the monopolistic decision process in a static setting, then we obtain the Nash 
equilibriums of the Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand games (Gibbons, 1992), and we 
discuss their relationship with the causal models, which are fully addressed in 
Subsection 4.3.  
 As we will see, repetition of the strategic behavior is fundamental for the 
successful use of causality models. This is because repetition of the experiment is 
essential to the generation of a reliable sample. The monopolistic decision process is 
instructive as a benchmark and provides the incentives for collusive behavior in 
infinitely repeated games of horizontal competition (Gibbons, 1992). Therefore, 
dynamic settings of complete information are addressed, where the players engage in 
games that repeat either a finite or an infinite number of times. At each repetition (stage), 
players can observe the history of the previous plays and outcomes before they make 
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new decisions. The problems solved here do not assume any specific functional forms 
and therefore yield the usual specifications found in the research literature as special 
cases, which pay particular attention to constant marginal costs and linear inverse 
demand functions. 
  
4.1.1 Monopoly 
 Consider a continuous and homogeneous of degree zero demand function for a 
single product, 𝑞 = 𝑓−1 𝒑,𝑚 ,  where p is the vector of competing product’s prices, and 
m is the level of income. Ceteris Paribus, then an inverse demand function for a single 
product can be written as 𝑝 = 𝑓(𝑞), (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Gibbons, 1992). 
Consider also a cost function, c(w, q), concave and homogeneous of degree one in the 
prices of inputs, w. Assuming that the monopoly’s level of output has no effect on the 
prices of the inputs and the monopolist profits are defined by  
 𝜋𝑚 = 𝑓 𝑞 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑐(𝒘,𝑞), (1) 
then, the monopoly solves: 
 max𝑞 𝑓 𝑞 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑐(𝒘, 𝑞) (2) 
with optimal output qm*, which is determined by the solution of the following first order 
condition: 
 
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝑞
= 𝑓 𝑞 + 𝑞 ∙ 𝑓 ′ 𝑞 −
𝜕𝑐  𝒘,𝑞 
𝜕𝑞
= 0 (3) 
The optimized level of profits becomes: 
 𝜋𝑚
∗ = 𝑓 𝑞𝑚
∗  ∙ 𝑞𝑚
∗ − 𝑐(𝒘, 𝑞𝑚
∗ ), (4) 
and the clearing monopolistic price is: 
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 𝑝𝑚
∗ = 𝑓(𝑞𝑚
∗ ). (5) 
 Equation (5) is a result that needs further discussion. This implies that the 
monopolist chooses a quantity which has an associated price determined by the demand 
function. But the consumer does not directly set the price. From a strategic perspective, 
the monopolist sets the price and then let’s the consumer purchase the quantities. 
Therefore, the monopolist does have the ability to manipulate the consumer’s behavior. 
Summarizing, the monopolist produces a quantity, then sets the price, then lets the 
consumer buy those quantities. This implies the following causal relationship: qm
*
 → pm
*
 
→ qc, where qc is the consumer’s actual consumption which should equal qm
*
. 
 
4.1.2 Nash Equilibrium of the Cournot Game 
 But monopolies are rarely found. Cournot analyzed the possibility of two 
existing firms competing for the same market (Gibbons, 1992). Considering an 
oligopolistic scenario of I firms, each of them chooses how much to supply taking into 
account the effect of the quantities supplied by all others on the market’s price through 
the consumer’s demand function, and therefore the level of profits. Given an inverse 
demand function for a single product, firm i in a Cournot game will maximize profits 
c
: 
 max𝑞 𝑓 𝑞
𝑐 ∙ 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖(𝒘,𝑞𝑖), (6) 
where q
c
 is the total quantity supplied to the market by all the firms:  
 𝑞𝑐 =  𝑞𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1  (7) 
The first order condition is: 
 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= 𝑓 𝑞𝑐 + 𝑞𝑖 ∙
𝜕𝑓  𝑞𝑐 
𝜕𝑞𝑐
∙  1 +  
𝜕𝑞𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖  −
𝜕𝑐𝑖 𝒘,𝑞𝑖 
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= 0. (8) 
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Assuming that no firm has an effect on the decisions of the other companies, then each 
firm will maximize its profits by solving for qi from: 
 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝑐
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= 𝑓 𝑞𝑐   + 𝑞𝑖 ∙
𝜕𝑓 𝑞𝑐   
𝜕𝑞𝑐  
−
𝜕𝑐𝑖 𝒘,𝑞𝑖 
𝜕𝑞𝑖
= 0. (9) 
Given that we have I firms, then equation (9) represents a system of I equations and I 
unknowns that must be solved simultaneously.  
 The game theory literature usually resorts to a linear inverse demand function 
along with constant marginal costs to demonstrate that the solution to this system will 
yield a total level of quantities superior to the ones supplied by the monopoly, q
c
* > qm* 
(Gibbons, 1992). This translates to a market price lower than that of the monopoly, along 
with lower profits to the firms, and therefore giving incentives for collusion. Such 
collusion would seek to restrict the output and therefore equally distribute the 
monopolistic profits given by equation (4).  
 Directly related to the objective of this dissertation, the system of equations (9) 
implies that the solution to each firm’s choice of quantity qi* will have the form qi* = 
gi
c
(w, q-i*) for all i, were q-i* is the vector that represents all the quantities supplied by 
all other firms not including firm i. In consequence, we could manipulate the value of qi*  
by changing the value of any of the quantities supplied by any other firm, which in turn 
can also be manipulated by changing the value of qi*. In other words, quantities are 
jointly and simultaneously determined in a Cournot game, and such joint determination 
should be detected by algorithms of causality that allow for cyclical structures. Such 
simultaneous causality will be represented by a graph that connects any two firms’ 
production by a two-head arrow (i.e. qi ↔ qj). Moreover, if these firms decide to collude, 
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then they would acquire the ability to manipulate the consumer’s choices as it was the 
case with the monopoly. Assuming identical firms, then each of them would have a one 
directional causal relationship with the consumer qi → pm
*
  → qc. On the other hand, 
failure to coordinate would imply that the consumer would not be manipulated. 
Therefore the causal relationship would be reversed (i.e. qi ← qc). 
 
4.1.3 Nash Equilibrium of the Stackelberg Game 
 Stackelberg  analyzed a different game in which there is an industry leader whose 
choice of quantities will cause all others to best respond (Gibbons, 1992). Then, consider 
firm s as the leader in a market of I firms. Each firm other than firm s will solve the 
problem in equation (6) with solution qi* given by (9). The Stackelberg leader 
anticipates this and can make these responses as a part of its maximizing problem 
described by the equation: 
  max𝑞𝑠 𝑓 𝑞
𝑠 ∙ 𝑞𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠(𝒘, 𝑞𝑠) (10) 
where qs is the quantity supplied by the Stackelberg leader, and q
s
 is the total quantity 
supplied to the market by all the firms:  
 𝑞𝑠 = 𝑞𝑠 +  𝑞𝑖
∗𝐼
𝑖≠𝑠  (11) 
The first order condition now becomes: 
 
𝜕𝜋𝑠
𝜕𝑞𝑠
= 𝑓 𝑞𝑠 + 𝑞𝑠 ∙
𝜕𝑓 𝑞𝑠 
𝜕𝑞𝑠
∙  1 +  
𝜕𝑞𝑖
∗
𝜕𝑞𝑠
𝑖≠𝑠  −
𝜕𝑐𝑠 𝒘,𝑞𝑠 
𝜕𝑞𝑠
= 0 (12) 
where the derivative of qi* can be computed with the help of the Envelope Theorem. 
Notice that the solution of equation (12), qs*, is a function of the vector of input prices 
w, but not of the quantities supplied by all the other firms, qs* = gs
s
(w). In contrast, the I 
 27 
-1 Stackelberg follower firms do depend on the level of output provided by the 
Stackelberg leader, qi* = gi
s
(w, qj
s
*, qs*) for all i ≠ j, s. This implies that although there 
is a bidirectional relationship between any firm other than the Stackelberg leader, qi ↔ 
qj, it is the Stackelberg leader who decides the output for everybody. Therefore, there 
should be a one way causal relationship between the Stackelberg leader and every 
Stackelberg follower (i.e. qs → qi for all i ≠ s). Moreover, the bidirectional relationship 
among the followers should only be elicited when the Stackelberg leader is not present 
in the analysis. 
 In the Stackelberg game, the aggregated level of quantities supplied to the market 
will be even higher than that of the Cournot game, and therefore higher than those 
supplied by the monopoly, q
s
* > q
c
* > qm*. This results in an even more reduced level of 
profits. But this time, the profits received by the Stackelberg leader are superior to those 
received by the agents in a Cournot game. Although, the level of profits received by the 
Stackelberg followers will be lower than the c, the level of profits received by the 
leader will not make it desirable to relinquish its position. On the other hand, the 
Stackelberg followers have incentives to pretend that they do not see the leader’s 
strategy, forcing the Stackelberg leader to abandon his policy and enforce a Cournot 
equilibrium (Gibbons, 1992). 
 
4.1.4 Nash Equilibrium of the Bertrand Game 
  The last of the games to be discussed is the one described by Bertrand (Gibbons, 
1992). In this circumstance, firms use the output price as the choice variable. Whenever 
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we consider non differentiated products, this scenario leads the Bertrand Paradox which 
describes a battle of prices that ends on a zero profits level for a competitive 
environment with non differentiated products. This is because the set of available 
strategies to the firms do not reach a Nash equilibrium (Equation 13). 
  𝑞𝑖 =  
𝑞 𝑝𝑖  𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 <  𝑝𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
𝑞 𝑝𝑖 
𝐼
 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 =  𝑝𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑗 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
   0    𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 >  𝑝𝑗  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑗 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
  (13) 
 The Bertrand Parodox would ensure that prices and quantities are not determined 
by the interactions with the competition, but by each firm’s own ability to reduce their 
marginal costs. Therefore, the quantities/prices supplied by firms in a Bertrand game are 
independent of each other (i.e. qi qj, pi  pj) and no causality pattern should be found. 
There are a few scenarios that provide an escape to the Bertrand Paradox (Mas-Colell et 
al., 2004); Restrictions in the capacity of production (decreasing returns to scale), 
product differentiation, and adding a temporal dimension by allowing for a repeated 
game.  
 Restrictions in the capacity allow firms to price above their marginal cost, but 
this equilibrium is not easy to determine. This is because the lowest pricing firm will not 
be able to supply the whole market and rationing rules must be imposed to determine 
which consumers buy from each of the competing firms in this scenario. Unfortunately, 
none of the rationing rules is more likely than the others, and the equilibrium strongly 
depends on which rule is being imposed. However, the solution for the Cournot game 
results as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the Bertrand game when firms are 
allowed to choose capacity first, and then compete in prices (Mas-Colell et al., 2004). 
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 Product differentiation is of special interest to our study because of the data that 
we have available for the Case Study offered in Section 5. Although our empirical 
research studied products in a highly competitive environment, their producers invest 
heavily in branding to set themselves apart. This is because differentiated products 
bestow some market power to their products given by the ―elimination‖ of close 
substitutes. However, the producer’s ability to manipulate its price will be bounded by 
the consumers’ willingness to pay a premium over its closest substitute. This will result 
on a price slightly above their marginal cost (Mas-Colell et al. 2004). Therefore, the 
expected causal structure among different competitors remains as that of the 
undifferentiated products. 
 Finally, when repetitions of the game are allowed, then the Folk Theorems apply 
and therefore the monopolistic level of profits is feasible (Friedman, 1971) by 
collectively producing the monopoly quantity qm* and charging the monopoly price pm*, 
thus eliciting simultaneous determination of quantities. This strategy is not confined to 
the Bertrand game, because firms engaged in a Cournot relationship would also find it 
desirable to collude. 
 
4.1.5 Game Repetition 
 The Folk Theorems make it imperative to pay attention to dynamic games of 
complete information. These are games with repetition where all previous moves by all 
players can be observed before the next action is chosen, and players move either in 
sequence or simultaneously (complete but imperfect information). As shown by Slade 
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(1992), players can observe past actions played by competitors. Therefore, threats and 
promises signaled through supplied quantities and/or prices can influence the behavior of 
the competitors, and more desirable equilibriums become feasible provided that players 
are patient enough, and the end of the economic relationship is not foreseeable. Bertrand 
and Cournot players can tacitly collude to achieve the monopolistic profits at each stage 
(repetition of the game) which still requires joint and simultaneous determination, 
Stackelberg leaders can learn their competitors’ best response to make it endogenous in 
their decision process, and Stackelberg followers can observe the leader’s optional 
choice as an exogenous determinant in their own profits maximizing process.  Thus, the 
modification of the competitors’ behavior through signals in repeated tacit relationships 
justifies the use of causal models to identify the nature of those relationships. Assuming 
that threats and promises are actually implemented, then these actions should cause 
changes in the competitors’ quantities and/or prices. 
 Punishment strategies deserve a short discussion. Strategies that consist on 
punishing forever by alternating the choice of quantities (or prices) would be elicited by 
a causal model because one player directly causes the actions of the other. Thus, Tit-for-
Tat strategies could potentially lead to misleading interpretations of the results. On the 
other hand, Trigger strategies just end cooperation. However, Green and Porter (1984) 
discussed that firms cannot always distinguish between deviations from collusion 
agreements and market shocks. Therefore, infinite punishment strategies would not be 
optimal since they could by triggered by accident (Gibbons, 1992). In any case, both 
Trigger and Tit-for-Tat strategies would generate an empirical structural break on the 
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relationship among the agents. In other words, the covariance structure among the 
variables would elicit the change from cooperation to no-cooperation, which can be 
examined with log-likelihood ratio tests. 
 As discussed previously, regardless of being or not a repeated game,  quantities 
are jointly and simultaneously determined when a Cournot game is played, i.e. qi* = 
gi
c
(w, q-i*). Quantities or prices should appear independent in a Bertrand setup unless 
there is tacit collusion in a repeated game. In such cases, the use of threats and 
punishments would induce a simultaneous determination of prices. Stackelberg leaders 
would directly affect followers’ quantities, qi* = gi
s
(w, qj
s
*, qs*), but quantities supplied 
by Stackelberg followers should not directly cause the Stackelberg leader’s optimal 
choice, qs* = gs
s
(w). These causal relationships can be elicited through causality 
inference models. Subsection 4.3 discusses such models in detail. Prior to that section, 
we now proceed to study the theoretical relationship between a retailer and its providers 
within this framework. 
   
4.2 THEORETICAL MODEL: VERTICAL COMPETITION 
 In this section, we extend the framework previously described in Section 4.1 to 
analyze equilibriums associated with a perfect coordination of the supply chain, 
simultaneous determination (vertical Nash), a Stackelberg game where the manufacturer 
is the leader (manufacturer-Stackelberg), and a Stackelberg game where the retailer is 
the leader (retailer-Stackelberg). Finally we discuss how our results change in the 
presence of monopolistic behavior. The objective of this section is thus to relate each of 
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these equilibriums to the causal inference models. Our theoretic framework is similar to 
the one provided by Lee and Staelin (1997), but there is a subtle yet important 
difference. In their study, the members of the supply chain obtain their profits by 
charging a margin over the cost of the product. Therefore, the margin is their decision 
variable which is chosen to maximize profits subject to the actions of the other members 
of the supply chain. For this reason, the choice of margin becomes the best response. 
McGuire and Staelin (1983) argued that there is no loss in generality when the 
framework studies margins instead of prices. This is because it only requires a rescaling 
of these variables if the manufacturer and the retailer have constant marginal costs. Our 
framework is thus different because we use the wholesale and retail prices as the choice 
variables in each of the maximization problems (Mcguire and Staelin, 1983; Choi, 1991; 
Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim, 2000).  
 Given one manufacturer, one retailer, and one product, the following (modified) 
assumptions observed by Lee and Staelin (1997) also apply: 
Assumption 1: The demand for the product is downward slopping. 
Assumption 2: Manufacturers face a constant marginal cost c. Retailers face a 
constant marginal cost d which can equal zero. 
Assumption 3: All the firms have perfect knowledge of the demand and cost 
structures within the industry. 
Assumption 4: Players can observe each other’s actions. 
Assumption 5: There exists a unique set of equilibriums.  
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 All of these assumptions are common in the literature, except for Assumption 4. 
But as shown by Slade (1992), not only firms can observe past actions played by their 
competitors, but they might also engage in periods of learning after demand or supply 
shocks disturb and change an old equilibrium. Assumption 2 might deserve some 
attention as well. Constant marginal costs are usually assumed to focus on the 
interactions of the agents in the supply chain, and not on disturbances exogenous to the 
strategic decisions. 
 Before we proceed, it is imperative to have a discussion about the role of the 
consumer in a causality setting. Since the consumer maximizes utility by choosing how 
much to consume, but never by choosing prices, then the consumer will always be a 
source of causality in an environment with enough availability of substitutes. In other 
words, the retailer will choose its price (or quantities) as a best response to the demand 
function. This conjecture may deserve further study since it conflicts with Samuelson’s 
mixed demand systems where prices are exogenous for some products, and quantities are 
exogenous for some others (Stockton, Capps, and Bessler, 2008). Nevertheless, the 
empirical research presented here supports our postulation that the consumer acts as a 
causal source. In particular, we found 93% of the times that the quantities consumed by 
the patrons of Dominick’s Finer Foods directly cause either the retailer or the 
manufacturer’s price. This is because the availability of substitutes restricts the retailer’s 
ability to manipulate its prices. Therefore, although the following analytical description 
of the Nash equilibriums studies a demand function, q=q(p), where p is a scalar instead 
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of a vector, we must have in mind that the demand function, q(p), has to be somewhat 
elastic.  
 
4.2.1 Perfect Coordination 
 The analysis of perfect coordination of the supply chain is of special interest 
because the firms do not engage in double marginalization which may be a more 
efficient distribution of profits
4
. However, McGuire and Staelin (1983, 1986), and 
Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989) showed that perfect coordination is not the best 
alternative for manufacturers of highly substitutable products. Therefore, a centralized 
decision maker, or perfect vertical integration, does not provide an adequate benchmark 
to compare different strategies pursued by supply chain members in a highly competitive 
environment. Nevertheless, the equilibrium is analyzed below for the sake of 
completeness. 
 Consider a retailer with constant marginal cost d, who purchases q quantities of a 
product at price pm
i
, which will be sold at price pr
i
 (i stands for integration). Then, the 
profits of this retailer are given by  
  𝜋𝑟
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑟
𝑖 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑚
𝑖 ∙ 𝑞. (14) 
Consider also a manufacturer with constant marginal cost c, who provides q quantities at 
price pm
i. Then this manufacturer’s profits are given by 
  𝜋𝑚
𝑖 = 𝑝𝑚
𝑖 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞. (15) 
                                                 
4
 A single profit margin is charged over the overall cost of producing and selling a product. This margin is 
thereafter distributed among the manufacturer and the retailer according to a joint agreement. 
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Then, a perfectly integrated supply chain can be modeled as a centralized decision maker 
with profit function: 
  𝜋𝑖 = (𝑝𝑟
𝑖 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑚
𝑖 ∙ 𝑞) + (𝑝𝑚
𝑖 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞) (16) 
  = (𝑝𝑟
𝑖 − 𝑑 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝑞, (17) 
where the manufacturer’s price is irrelevant to the determination of profits since the 
perfectly vertically integrated firm pays the money to itself. This integrated firm 
maximizes profits by choosing prices (Mcguire and Staelin, 1983; Choi, 1991; Kadiyali, 
Chintagunta, and Vilcassim, 2000). The first order condition thus becomes: 
  
𝜕𝜋 𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 = 𝑞 +  𝑝𝑟
𝑖 − 𝑑 − 𝑐 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 = 0, (18) 
  𝑝𝑟
𝑖 = 𝑐 + 𝑑 − 𝑞  
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 
−1
. (19) 
 Equation (19) is the optimal pricing policy for a perfectly integrated firm, which 
can be written in a more parsimonious way when multiplying the whole equation by pr
i
/q 
and isolating for pr
i
:  
  𝑝𝑟
𝑖 =  𝑐 + 𝑑  
𝜀
1+𝜀
 , (20) 
where  is the own price elasticity of the product. The retailer price in an integrated firm 
is therefore a function of the elasticity of demand, and the total marginal cost of 
producing and marketing the product. Substituting Equation (20) into in Equation (17) 
yields the profits of the perfectly coordinated supply chain: 
  𝜋𝑖 = −𝑞 𝑐 + 𝑑  
1
1+𝜀
 . (21) 
 This leads to the conclusion that the perfectly integrated firm will only have 
positive profits when the denominator in Equation (21) is negative, which is only true for 
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an elastic demand. Interestingly, the pricing policy (Equation 20) results in an infinitely 
large price as the elasticity approaches -1, and negative prices thereafter. Therefore, this 
approach seems inadequate for this kind of products.  
 Considering elastic products and assuming that the manufacturer and the retailer 
are two different agents, we can obtain the implied manufacturer’s profits, and the 
implied manufacturer price by dividing the integrated firm’s profits according to a 
predetermined proportion h. Substituting Equation (19) into Equation(17), multiplying 
by h, and equating to Equation (15) yields: 
 
  𝜋𝑚
𝑖 = −ℎ𝑞2  
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 
−1
=  𝑝𝑚
𝑖 − 𝑐 𝑞, (22) 
which implies: 
  𝑝𝑚
𝑖 = 𝑐 − ℎ𝑞  
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 
−1
. (23) 
As expected, the manufacturer’s price not only depends on the cost of manufacturing, 
but on the consumer’s reaction to the retailer’s price as well.  
 Equations (19) and (23) are the important relationships that we have to consider 
for our causality analysis. Bessler and Kling (1984) discussed that only stationary series 
should be considered to avoid spurious results. Indeed, the changes in marginal costs 
could affect our conclusions. Therefore, taking differences on Equations (19) and (23), 
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and assuming that the consumer demand function has a constant slope at a certain level, 
we can isolate the strategic behavior from the cost of marketing and production
5
: 
  ∆𝑝𝑟
𝑖 = − 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 
−1
∙ ∆𝑞, (24) 
  ∆𝑝𝑚
𝑖 = −ℎ  
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 
−1
∙ ∆𝑞. (25) 
Moreover, Equations (24) and (25) were obtained by a single decision maker which 
divides the profits among the supply chain according to the ratio h. This implies that 
both prices should be jointly determined, and their correlation should be statistically 
significant. But as we can see through Equations (24) and (25), it is the consumer who 
ultimately drives both prices. Therefore, this correlation should disappear when 
conditioning on q. Thus, q should make those prices d-separated, and the following 
causal structure should be observed: pr
i
 ← q → pm
i
. A different conclusion is reached 
when the supply chain has monopolistic power. The pertinent analysis is deferred to 
Subsection 4.2.5. 
  
4.2.2 Vertical Nash 
 Hereafter, consider the existence of independent decision makers. Thus, both the 
manufacturer and the retailer maximize their profits by choosing their own prices 
without coordination. Therefore, we can rewrite Equation (14) to obtain the retailer 
profit function: 
  𝜋𝑟 = 𝑝𝑟 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑚 ∙ 𝑞, (26) 
                                                 
5
 It is not unrealistic to assume a constant slope in the demand functions given the small size of the 
changes in price. This assumption, or constant elasticities, lies at the heart of many demand models  
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
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where the super index i has been removed to indicate the absence of a centralized 
decision maker. For this reason, the manufacturer price is considered exogenous, leading 
to the following first order condition: 
  
𝜕𝜋𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟
= 𝑞 +  𝑝𝑟 − 𝑑 − 𝑝𝑚  ∙
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
= 0,  (27) 
which yields to the following pricing policy: 
  𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑑 − 𝑞 ∙  
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
 
−1
 . (28) 
An equivalent, and perhaps more intuitive version of this pricing policy, is obtained by 
multiplying Equation (28) by pr /q and isolating for pr , which leads to: 
  𝑝𝑟 = (𝑝𝑚 + 𝑑)  
𝜀
1+𝜀
 . (29) 
 Equation (29) suggests that the retailer will charge a positive margin, rm, over 
the marginal cost for elastic demands. That is, /(1+) > 1 when  < -1, and thus rm = 
pr – pm – d > 0. But Equation (29) also implies that the margin is reduced as the demand 
becomes more elastic. In particular, a perfect elastic demand yields the no profits 
condition for a retailer in a perfect competitive market: 
  𝑝𝑟 = lim𝜀→−∞   𝑝𝑚 + 𝑑  
𝜀
1+𝜀
  = 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑑. (30) 
But this pricing policy does not work for inelastic goods. In particular, Equation (30) 
tends to infinity for unit elastic products, and to zero for perfectly inelastic goods: 
  𝑝𝑟 = lim𝜀→−1−   𝑝𝑚 + 𝑑  
𝜀
1+𝜀
  = ∞, (31) 
  𝑝𝑟 = lim𝜀→0−   𝑝𝑚 + 𝑑  
𝜀
1+𝜀
  = 0. (32) 
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Therefore, Equations (31) and (32) strongly suggest that there cannot be an equilibrium 
of this type when inelastic goods are considered. This leads to the conclusion that 
different strategies or pricing behavior would be pursued in that scenario. 
 We can study the manufacturer’s pricing policy in the same fashion. Rewriting 
Equation (15), we can state the manufacturer’s profits as Equation (33), the associated 
first order condition in Equation (34), and the pricing policy in Equation (35): 
  𝜋𝑚 =  𝑝𝑚 − 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞 (33) 
  
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝑝𝑚
= 𝑞 +  𝑝𝑚 − 𝑐 ∙
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑚
= 0 (34) 
  𝑝𝑚 = 𝑐 − 𝑞 ∙  
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑚
 
−1
. (35) 
 This is perhaps a controversial result. If the retailer and the manufacturer are 
independent decision makers, then (𝜕𝑝𝑟)/(𝜕𝑝𝑚  ) equals zero, and no information can be 
learned from Equation (34). This suggests that the manufacturer cannot ignore the 
retailer’s pricing policy. This is because the consumer makes his decisions based on the 
retailer’s price, and not on the manufacturer’s price. However, the manufacturer cannot 
directly learn the retailer’s best response because the choice of prices is assumed to 
occur simultaneously. Given that the manufacturer knows that the retailer’s benefits are 
described by Equation (26), then a suboptimal response by the retailer could be 
assumed
6
: 
  𝑝𝑟 = 𝑝𝑚 + 𝑑 +  
𝜋𝑟
𝑞
, (36) 
which yields: 
                                                 
6
 Notice that this is equivalent to assuming a fixed price markup. Moreover, the manufacturer can identify 
the consumer’s preferences and therefore infer the retailer’s best response. 
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𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑚
= 1. (37) 
In other words, the manufacturer could expect a one-to-one relationship between his 
price and the one chosen by the retailer. Substituting Equation (37) into Equation (35) 
yields the following two optimal pricing policies for the manufacturer, which are 
equivalent: 
  𝑝𝑚 = 𝑐 − 𝑞 ∙  
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝑝𝑟
 
−1
, (38) 
  𝑝𝑚 = 𝑐 −
𝑝𝑟
𝜀
. (39) 
 Equation (38) demonstrates that the manufacturer’s choice of margin, mm, has 
fewer restrictions than the retailer when a retailer’s proportional response is assumed.  
Given a normal product, the manufacturer’s margin, mm = pm – c, will be positive, but 
the elasticity of the product plays a different role. Specifically,  Equations (40) 
respectively demonstrate that the manufacturer’s pricing policy for perfectly elastic, unit 
elastic, and perfectly inelastic products, is not discontinuous as it is in the retailer’s 
problem. Therefore, the manufacturer’s pricing policy is to charge just enough to match 
his marginal costs for perfectly elastic products, and increase his margin as they become 
more inelastic. This implies that the retailer has greater incentives than the manufacturer 
to change the supply chain relationship as products become more inelastic. 
  𝑝𝑚 = lim𝜀→−∞  𝑐 −
𝑝𝑟
𝜀
 = 𝑐,  
  𝑝𝑚 = lim𝜀→−1−  𝑐 −
𝑝𝑟
𝜀
 = 𝑐 + 𝑝𝑟 , (40) 
  𝑝𝑚 = lim𝜀→0−  𝑐 −
𝑝𝑟
𝜀
 = ∞.  
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 Moreover, a closer look at Equation (38) reveals that the pricing decision of the 
manufacturer depends from the quantities purchased by the consumer, which in turn are 
affected by the retailer’s price. This implies that the manufacturer’s knowledge of the 
consumer’s consumption should screen off the information transferred through the 
retailer.  We can observe this behavior by reducing the amount of factors that affect the 
pricing decisions. Thus, assuming that the consumer behavior remains constant, 
differencing Equations (28) and (38) yields: 
  ∆𝑝𝑟 = ∆𝑝𝑚 −  
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 
−1
∙ ∆𝑞, (41) 
  ∆𝑝𝑚 = − 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝑖 
−1
∙ ∆𝑞. (42) 
On the other hand, if the retailer’s best response is not assumed to be constant, then 
Equation (35) is the relevant pricing policy for the manufacturer which becomes 
Equation (43) when written in differences: 
  ∆𝑝𝑚 = − 
𝜕𝑞
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑟
𝜕𝑝𝑚
 
−1
∙ ∆𝑞. (43) 
 These results imply the two different causal patterns shown in Figure 2. If the 
manufacturer expects a one-to-one  response from the retailer, then Equations (41) and 
(42) imply the causal pattern shown in Figure 2.a. This graph represents a scenario 
where the consumer is the causal source for both the manufacturer and the retailer, and 
there exists a one-directional causal relationship from the manufacturer to the retailer. 
However, the structure shown in Figure 2.a cannot be identified from observational data. 
This is because its associated probability distribution, Pr(q,pr,pm) = Pr(q) Pr(pm|q) 
Pr(pr|q,pm), is the same as Pr(q,pr,pm) = Pr(pm) Pr(q|pm) Pr(pr|q,pm) which is coupled to an  
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identical graph but with a reversed causal relationship between q and pm. Haigh and 
Bessler (2004) proved that these two graphs cannot be distinguished from each other  
because they are Observationally Equivalent. That is, they have the same edge structure 
and converging causal patterns, which render the same statistical loss function metric 
when the DAGs are estimated. Therefore, the algorithms will not determine the correct 
causal structure. 
 If the manufacturer assumes an exogenous but non constant response from the 
retailer, then equations (41) and (43) describe the equilibrium. Figure 2.b represents this 
scenario, where the same relationship exists with the consumer, but a bidirectional 
causal relationship exists between the manufacturer and the retailer. These conclusions 
are in line with Lee and Staelin’s (1997) observation that is important to distinguish the 
Figure 2 Vertical Nash Causal Relationships. 
 
 
 
 
 
a) 
 
Scenario when there is an exogenous 
constant response from the retailer. 
 The consumer causes both prices. 
 The manufacturer causes the price of 
the retailer. 
 
b) 
 
Scenario when there is an exogenous, 
non constant, and non independent 
response from the retailer. 
 The consumer causes both prices. 
 The manufacturer and retailer’s 
prices are simultaneously 
determined.  
 
  
  
  
P r P m 
q  
P r P m 
q  
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actual pricing policy being implemented, which in this case reveals the manufacturer’s 
decision process.  
 
4.2.3 Manufacturer as a Leader in a Stackelberg Game 
 In the previous subsection, we discussed the causal patterns that are expected 
when the manufacturer and the retailer act with no coordination. We also concluded that 
there are incentives for both agents to abandon this scenario. Stackelberg games are 
those in which one agent acts as a leader and the other reacts as a follower, and thus the 
pricing process occurs in two stages. In the first stage, the leader chooses his price. In the 
second stage, the second agent sees the price chosen by the leader and best responds to 
that price, and the consumer chooses how much to purchase. Since the leader knows that 
the second agent will react in such way, then the leader can use the follower’s best 
response as a part of his optimization problem.  
 In particular, when the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader, the 
manufacturer sets his price in stage one and knows that the retailer will maximize his 
profits in stage two by implementing the pricing policy described by Equation (28). We 
can rewrite Equation (28) to emphasize this process: 
  𝑝𝑟 ,2 = 𝑝𝑚 ,1 + 𝑑 − 𝑞2 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
 
−1
 , (44) 
where subscripts have been added to highlight that some variables are realized at 
different stages. Using the same notation, the manufacturer’s profits become: 
  𝜋𝑚 ,2 =  𝑝𝑚 ,1 − 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞2, (45) 
and the first order condition is: 
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𝜕𝜋𝑚 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,1
= 𝑞2 +  𝑝𝑚 ,1 − 𝑐 ∙
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,1
= 0. (46) 
But now the manufacturer can account for the effect on the retailer’s best response 
described by Equation (44). Therefore, the effect of the manufacturer’s price on the 
retailer’s best response is given by: 
  
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,1
= 1 −   
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
 
−1
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,1
− 𝑞2  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
 
−2
𝜕2𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,1
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,1
 = 0,  (47) 
which comes from the derivation of Equation (44) with respect to the manufacturer’s 
price. The second term in the parenthesis disappears because q2(.) cannot explicitly 
depend on pm,1. For this reason, Equation (47) can be reduced to: 
  
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,1
=
1
2
 ,  
which substituted in the manufacturer’s first order condition yields 
  
𝜕𝜋𝑚 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,1
= 𝑞2 +  𝑝𝑚 ,1 − 𝑐 ∙
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
1
2
= 0, (48) 
which leads to: 
  𝑝𝑚 ,1 = 𝑐 − 2𝑞2 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
 
−1
, (49) 
  = 𝑐 −
2𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜀
. (50) 
Thereafter, 
  𝑝𝑚 ,1 = lim𝜀→−∞  𝑐 −
2𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜀
 = 𝑐,  
  𝑝𝑚 ,1 = lim𝜀→−1−  𝑐 −
2𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜀
 = 𝑐 + 2𝑝𝑟 , (51) 
  𝑝𝑚 ,1 = lim𝜀→0−  𝑐 −
2𝑝𝑟 ,2
𝜀
 = ∞.  
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 The Nash equilibrium of the manufacturer-Stackelberg game is thus described by 
Equations (44) and (49). As it was the case for the vertical Nash equilibrium, Equations 
(51) show that the manufacturer’s pricing policy is to charge just enough to match his 
marginal costs for perfectly elastic products, and increase his margin as they become 
more inelastic. However, Equation (49) has a larger slope than that in Equation (39), 
which implies a bigger manufacturer price. Therefore the retailer is obligated to reduce 
its margin in order to maintain a constant level of sales of a normal good. In other words, 
given a certain level of demand, the manufacturer is able to extract a larger share of the 
total supply chain profits. 
 As we did before, we assume that the consumer behavior is constant and we 
isolate the strategic relationship among the variables by taking differences on the pricing 
policy functions described by Equations (44) and (49): 
  ∆𝑝𝑟 ,2 = ∆𝑝𝑚 ,1 −  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
 
−1
∙ ∆𝑞2 , (52) 
  ∆𝑝𝑚 ,1 = −2  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,2
 
−1
∙ ∆𝑞2, (53) 
 These results lead to our conclusions. Since the retailer has to choose the price 
after the manufacturer has chosen his, then the retailer’s price can be manipulated by 
changing the manufacturer’s price, but not otherwise. Therefore the retailer’s price is 
caused by the manufacturer’s price. Moreover, Equation (52) indicates that the retailer’s 
choice of price is also subject to the consumer’s choice of quantities, which are 
determined in stage two as well. Since the decision of the manufacturer occurs in stage 
1, therefore the manufacturer’s price and the consumer’s quantities are only related 
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through Equation (44). This implies that pm,1 and q2 should seem independent because 
the quantities sought by the manufacturer may not be the actual quantities purchased by 
the consumer. But conditioning on pr,2 should reveal the existing relationship described 
by equations (49) and (53). These relationships are best described by the collider shown 
in Figure 3.  
 
4.2.4 Retailer as a Leader in a Stackelberg Game 
 We study the other direction of a Stackelberg game in this subsection. The 
previous subsection described the equilibrium and consequential causal pattern elicited 
when the manufacturer acts as a leader. Here, we study the case in which the retailer 
chooses which price to charge for a product, and the manufacturer best responds to 
whatever price was chosen by the retailer. For this reason, it is the retailer who can use 
the manufacturer’s best response as part of its maximization process. Rewriting the 
maximization problems with subscripts in order to emphasize the stage process, the 
manufacturer’s profit functions is: 
  𝜋𝑚 ,2 =  𝑝𝑚 ,2 − 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞2, (54) 
Figure 3 Manufacturer Stackelberg Causal Relationship. 
 
 
 
 
The retailer is subject to both the manufacturer’s and the consumer’s choices when the 
manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader. This makes the retailer’s price a collider. 
 
 
 
 
P r P m 
q  
 47 
and the manufacturer’s first order condition and respective pricing policy are: 
  
𝜕𝜋𝑚 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
= 𝑞2 +  𝑝𝑚 ,2 − 𝑐 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 ∙  
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
∗
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
 = 0. (55) 
  𝑝𝑚 ,2 = 𝑐 − 𝑞2 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
∙
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
∗
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
 
−1
. (56) 
 Notice in the last two equations that an asterisk (*) appears as a superscript on 
the retailer’ price in Equations (55) and (56). This is because this price has already been 
chosen in stage one. Although this is an exogenous function for the manufacturer, it is 
not for the retailer. The retailer must anticipate the manufacturer’s choice. Thus, 
substituting the manufacturer’s best response into the retailer’s profit function, the 
retailer’s profit function becomes: 
  𝜋𝑟 ,2 =  𝑝𝑟 ,1 − 𝑑 −  𝑐 − 𝑞2 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−1
∙  
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
 
−1
  ∙ 𝑞2, (57) 
where the asterisk has been removed from the retailer’s price in the manufacturer’s best 
response because this is an endogenous decision for the retailer. The associated first 
order condition is: 
  
𝜕𝜋𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
=  𝑝𝑟 ,1 − 𝑑 − 𝑐 + 𝑞2 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
∙
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
 
−1
 
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 (58) 
   +  1 +  
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
 
−1
∙  1 − 𝑞2  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−2
𝜕2𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,12
  𝑞2 = 0 , 
where the second term has been reduced since we would expect the cross partial 
derivative of pr,2 with respect to pm,2 and pr,2 equal to zero. Isolating for the retailer’s 
price we obtain: 
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  𝑝𝑟 ,1 = 𝑑 + 𝑐 − 𝑞2 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
∙
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
 
−1
 (59) 
   − 
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−1
 1 +  
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
 
−1
∙  1 − 𝑞2  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−2
𝜕2𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,12
  𝑞2 . 
 Equations (56) and (59) reveal a theoretical contradiction. The pricing policy for 
the retailer involves solving a partial differential equation, and its solution implies a 
simultaneous determination of the retailer’s and the manufacturer’s price. This conflicts 
with our assumption that the retailer chooses price first and lets the manufacturer pick its 
price as a best response. Clearly, the manufacturer’s actual choice of price would not 
affect the retailer’s decision because it has already taken place. Moreover, the retailer 
cannot ignore the manufacturer’s actions since Equations (56) and (59) would break 
down. Nevertheless, the manufacturer can infer an ―already happened best response‖ 
from the retailer by studying the consumer behavior, and thus the manufacturer’s 
decision has to be affected by his perception of the demand curve. On the other hand, the 
retailer can circumvent his problem by signaling a constant response to the 
manufacturer’s choice. Then: 
  
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
= 𝑘, (60) 
and Equations (56) and (59) are respectively reduced to: 
  𝑝𝑚 ,2 = 𝑐 − 𝑞2 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
∙ 𝑘 
−1
. (61) 
  𝑝𝑟 ,1 = 𝑑 + 𝑐 − 𝑞2 ∙  𝑘
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−1
 (62) 
   −𝑞2  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−1
 1 + 𝑘−1 − 𝑞2  𝑘
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−2
𝜕2𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,12
  . 
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But now the retailer has a second choice variable. The optimal choice of k is given by 
maximizing the new profit function with respect to k: 
  𝜋𝑟 ,2 =  𝑝𝑟 ,1 − 𝑑 −  𝑐 − 𝑞2 ∙  𝑘
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−1
  ∙ 𝑞2, (63) 
which has the following first order condition which also is a partial differential equation: 
  
𝜕𝜋𝑟 ,2
𝜕𝑘
= 𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝜕𝑘
− 𝑞2
2 𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
1
𝑘2
= 0 (64) 
 Equations (56) and (59) show that although the manufacturer is the second 
mover, more information other than the price is needed from the retailer. In turn, the 
retailer must provide a signal of his pricing policy in order to be time consistent. 
Nevertheless, repetition of the game ensures that k reveals the actual pricing policy 
pursued by the retailer. Otherwise, no equilibrium can be achieved since the 
manufacturer would have incentives to deviate. Taking differences on equations (61) and 
(62) yields: 
  ∆𝑝𝑚 ,2 = −∆𝑞2 ∙  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
∙ 𝑘 
−1
, (65) 
  ∆𝑝𝑟 ,1 = −∆𝑞2 ∙  𝑘
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−1
− ∆𝑞2  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−1
 1 + 𝑘−1  (66) 
   +∆𝑞2
2  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,1
 
−3
 𝑘−2
𝜕2𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑟 ,12
 = 0 . 
 Equation (65) shows that the manufacturer’s decision can be manipulated by both 
the consumer’s choice and the retailer’s signal, and equation (66) shows that the 
retailer’s price can only be influenced by the consumer’s choice. Nevertheless, the 
correlation between the retailer’s choice of price and the consumed quantities at any 
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given time should seem uncorrelated. This is because the retailer’s choice of price occurs 
in a previous stage. However, this is a theoretical impossibility. Thereafter, the retailer’s 
relationship with the consumer should be observed when conditioning on the 
manufacturer’s price. This implies that the manufacturer’s price must be a collider in a 
retailer-Stackelberg game and the causal structure in Figure 4 should be elicited.  
 
4.2.5 Monopoly 
 A special case of imperfect competition deserves attention. The retailer has the 
ability to exert monopolistic power when the consumer is unable to find substitutes. For 
this reason, the retailer is able to choose the level of quantities to introduced, and lets the 
consumer clear the market by ―choosing‖ the price. Moreover, the manufacturer will 
provide the quantities set by the retailer. For this reason, the retailer can be thought as a 
Stackelberg leader, where both the consumer and the manufacturer are the Stackelberg 
followers. Given a monotonic consumer demand function, q = D(p), then the consumer’s 
best response is the inverse demand function p = D
-1
(q). Therefore, monopolistic retailer 
maximizes his profits given by: 
Figure 4 Retailer Stackelberg Causal Relationship. 
 
 
 
The manufacturer is subject to both the retailer’s and the consumer’s choices when the 
retailer is a Stackelberg leader. This makes the manufacturer’s price a collider. 
 
 
 
 
P r P m 
q  
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  𝜋𝑟
𝑚 = 𝐷−1(𝑞1) ∙ 𝑞1 − 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞1 − 𝑝𝑚 ,2 ∙ 𝑞1, (67) 
where subscripts have been used to emphasize the timing of the decision process. The 
first order condition becomes: 
  
𝜕𝜋𝑟
𝑚
𝜕𝑞
= 𝑞1 ∙
𝜕𝐷−1(𝑞1)
𝜕𝑞1
+ 𝐷−1 𝑞1 − 𝑑 − 𝑝𝑚 ,2 = 0, (68) 
Isolating: 
  𝑞1 =  𝑑 + 𝑝𝑚 ,2 − 𝐷
−1 𝑞1   
𝜕𝐷−1(𝑞1)
𝜕𝑞1
 
−1
. (69) 
The price set by the retailer has to equal the consumer’s best response which is given by 
the consumer’s demand function: 
  𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝑚 = 𝐷−1(𝑞1), (70) 
where q1 is given by Equation (69). The consumer, in turn, purchases those quantities: 
  𝑞2 = 𝐷 𝑝𝑟 ,1
𝑚  = 𝑞1. (71) 
 On the other hand, the manufacturer chooses his price by maximizing: 
  𝜋𝑚 = (𝑝𝑚 ,2 − 𝑐)𝑞1, (72) 
which has the following associated first order condition: 
  
𝜕𝜋𝑚
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
= 𝑞1 + (𝑝𝑚 ,2 − 𝑐)
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
. (73) 
Notice that Equation (73) is fundamentally different to all the problems that we solved 
before. Here, the quantities introduced to the market are chosen by the retailer and 
therefore the manufacturer has a direct effect on this decision through Equation (69). 
Solving for pm,2 yields: 
  𝑝𝑚 ,2 = 𝑐 − 𝑞1  
𝜕𝑞2
𝜕𝑝𝑚 ,2
 
−1
=
𝑐−𝑑+𝐷−1(𝑞1)
2
. (74) 
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 These results imply that it is the retailer who acts as a causal source of 
information for both the manufacturer and the retailer, q ← pr → pm. This is because both 
the consumer and the manufacturer best respond to the retailer’s decision. 
 But a different conclusion is reached when there is monopolistic power along 
with coordination of the supply chain. If that is the case, then the problem can be 
modeled as a centralized decision maker with profit function: 
  𝜋𝑚 ,𝑖 =  𝐷−1(𝑞1) ∙ 𝑞1 − 𝑑 ∙ 𝑞1 − 𝑝𝑚
𝑖 ∙ 𝑞1 +  𝑝𝑚
𝑖 ∙ 𝑞1 − 𝑐 ∙ 𝑞1  (75) 
  = (𝐷−1(𝑞1) − 𝑑 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝑞1,  
which implies the following supply policy: 
  𝑞1 =  𝑑 + 𝑐 − 𝐷
−1 𝑞1  ∙  
𝜕𝐷−1 𝑞1 
𝜕𝑞1
 
−1
. (76) 
As we did before, the price set by the retailer has to equal the consumer’s best response 
which is given by the consumer’s demand function: 
  𝑝𝑟
𝑚 ,𝑖 = 𝐷−1(𝑞1), (77) 
where q1 is given by Equation (76). The consumer reacts by purchasing those quantities: 
  𝑞2 = 𝐷 𝑝𝑟
𝑚 ,𝑖 = 𝑞1. (78) 
However, this time the manufacturer’s price has to be obtained by equally dividing the 
supply chain’s total profits. This implies that the manufacturer’s price and the retailer’s 
price should look unrelated, unless the quantities purchased are observed. Since the 
consumer is clearing the market, then the consumer acts as a collider: pr → q ← pm. The 
relationships discussed in this subsection are summarized in Figure 5. 
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 We described in this subsection the causal patterns that can be expected from the 
different strategic relationships that occur among horizontal competition and within the 
supply chain. We now proceed to review how Directed Graphs can be used to elicit 
causal relationships among variables, and thus to imply the equilibriums described 
above.   
 
 4.3 DIRECTED GRAPHS 
 The previous subsection discussed the relationship between the determination of 
Nash equilibriums and causality. We concluded that Bertrand games lead to independent 
movements unless there is collusion in a repeated game. In such cases, the use of threats 
and punishments would induce a simultaneous determination of prices; Cournot games 
result in jointly determination of quantities and prices (i.e. qi ↔ qj; pi ↔ pj); and, 
Stackelberg leaders would directly affect followers’ quantities, but quantities supplied by 
Stackelberg followers should not directly cause the Stackelberg leader’s optimal choice 
Figure 5 Retailer’s Monopolistic Causal Relationship. 
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(i.e. qs → qi for all i ≠ s, where s represents the Stackelberg leader). These causal 
relationships can be elicited through causality inference models. We discuss in this 
subsection the machinery of causal models and the different algorithms used are outlined 
(Swanson and Granger, 1997; Pearl, 1995; Sprites et al., 1993; Richardson, 1996). 
Appendix A presents each of the algorithms in detail. 
 Let X1 cause X2 which causes X3. Or, in Causality notation, 321 XXX  . 
Then, the joint probability distribution of these three variables can be factored as: 
 ]|Pr[]|Pr[]Pr[],,Pr[ 23121321 xxxxxxxx   (79)
 
which is known as a causal Markov condition. This implies that conditioning on a causal 
variable yields the full probability distribution that generates a random variable, a 
behavior usually observed in prices. Generalizing,
 
 
 Pr 𝑥1, 𝑥1 , … , 𝑥𝑛 =  Pr 𝑥𝑖 |𝑝𝑎𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1    (80) 
where ],...,,Pr[ 21 nxxx  represents the joint probability of variables { nXXX ,...,, 21 } and 
pai represents the realization of some subset of variables that precede or cause Xi.  
Assuming the information set is both causally sufficient, i.e. there are no omitted 
variables that cause two included variables in the study (Sprites, 1993), and faithful, 
meaning that the relationship between two variables is not cancelled by the interactions 
of other variables, then Equation (79) can be used to represent causal relationships 
among the variables.  
 Three causal structures must be defined to illustrate. These are presented in 
Figure 6. The first one is the Collider: X→ Y ← Z. In this structure, information flows 
from X and Z towards Y, but not from X to Z nor Z to X. Y is the ―collider‖. 
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Interestingly, if Y is not observed, then X and Z would be unrelated, but given that Y is 
observed, the relationship between X and Z becomes visible. A good analogy is to think 
of a family. A couple seems unrelated until it is known they have a child. In a more 
technical language, conditioning on Y opens a communication path between X and Z. X 
and Z are said to be d-separated (Pearl, 1995), unconditionally. 
 The second causal structure to be defined is the causal fork: X ← Y → Z. Here Y 
causes both X and Z. Therefore, the correlation between X and Z will be nonzero since 
they share a common cause. But conditioning on Y makes the relationship between  X 
and Z disappear. Technically, X and Z are d-connected but conditioning on Y makes 
them d-separated.  
 Finally, we have the causal chain: X→ Y → Z. Now X causes Y, which in turn 
causes Z. The unconditional relationship between X and Z is non zero. But when 
conditioning on Y, the relationship disappears. It becomes d-separated.  
 More formally, in a set of variables {X, Y, Z}, the correlation between X and Z 
conditional on Y is zero if and only if X and Z are d-separated given Y. It is the d-
separation concept that allows the creation of searching algorithms that ultimately 
generate the Directed Graphs. Two kinds of graphs must be distinguished; Directed 
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) do not allow for a causal flow that eventually returns to the 
Figure 6 Basic Causal Structures in Search Algorithms. 
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variable where the information first originated. On the other hand, Directed Cyclic 
Graphs (DCG) do allow for such paths to exist which sometimes imply simultaneous 
determination. Both the PC algorithm (Sprites et al., 1993) and Moneta’s modification to 
the PC algorithm (Moneta, 2008) fall in the former category, whereas the Richardson’s 
algorithm (Richardson, 1996) falls in the later.  We created a truncated version of all 
these algorithms to analyze the causality of only three variables for the case of vertical 
competition. On the other hand, we used Tetrad 4.3.9-9 to study the horizontal 
relationships with the complete version of the Richardson’s algorithm. In the following 
subsections, we explain the different algorithms and describe precisely how they were 
implemented. The complete algorithms are included in the Appendix A with changes in 
notation from their original versions to conform to the notation used in this dissertation. 
 
4.3.1 PC Algorithm 
 This algorithm serves as the heart of all the procedures used in this research. 
Sprites et al. (1993), built the d-separation concept discussed above into the PC 
algorithm, which is programmed in the software TETRAD II (Scheines et al., 1994) and 
is used to generate the graphs by iteratively analyzing the correlation between two 
variables conditioned on another variable(s).  
 The algorithm initially connects all the variables with undirected edges (arrows 
with no heads). Then, with the aid of a Fisher significance test, edges are sequentially 
removed based on conditional or unconditional correlation determined to be statistically 
non significant. When a variable is removed, new relationships may be uncovered 
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between the remaining variables. Therefore, the remaining edges are checked once again 
and direction on causality can be inferred. For instance, suppose that the edge between X 
and Z has been removed unconditionally on Y. Then the relationship X – Y – Z can be 
directed as ZYX  . If the edge between X and Z was removed because the 
correlation between them was zero when conditioned on Y, then the causality is 
undetermined between ZYX  and ZYX   since the correlation structure of 
causal forks is the same that that of causal chains. In such a case, PC leaves the edges 
undirected and another variable is required to resolve the ambiguity. The PC algorithm 
follows: 
1. Create a complete undirected graph. That is, every variable to be studied is 
connected to every other variable with undirected edges. 
2. Sequentially remove edges based on vanishing correlation or conditional 
correlation. If i, j, k are normally distributed and  kjir |,  is the sample 
conditional correlation of i and j given k, then      nkjirznkjiz ,|,,|,   
is standard normal, where  kji |,  is the correlation between variable i and 
j conditional on variable k, and |k| is the number of variables that we are 
conditioning on.  z  is the Fisher statistic given by: 
  𝑧 𝜌 𝑖, 𝑗 𝑘 , 𝑛 =  
1
2
 𝑛 −  𝑘 − 3 𝑙𝑛  
1+𝜌 𝑖 ,𝑗  𝑘 
1−𝜌 𝑖 ,𝑗  𝑘 
  . (81)
 
3. Direct the surviving edges. Some variable(s) were used to condition the 
relationship in order to remove the edges. Such variable(s) are termed the 
sepset of the variables whose edge has been removed. The PC algorithm 
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directs an edge between X and Y into variable Z if Z is not in the sepset of X 
and Y. 
4. The last part of the algorithm is intended to detect more edges and avoid the 
existence of cycles. But Scheines et al. (1994) found that this part reduces the 
reliability of the results and therefore are not implemented here. 
 The algorithm may make mistakes of two types: including or omitting an edge, 
and direction of an edge. In order to achieve accurate results, the significance level 
should be decreased as the sample size is increased (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 
(2000)
7
. The complete algorithm has been included in Appendix A. 
 
4.3.2 Moneta’s Algorithm 
 Moneta (2008) argued that the PC Algorithm  made mistakes too often, and 
therefore suggested that it was necessary to build a more conservative algorithm. He 
introduced a slightly modified version customized to analyze the innovations of a VAR. 
He modified the algorithm in two important ways: 
1. The notion of Sepset is modified. Now a Sepset of size n includes all possible 
combinations of the n conditioning variables. For instance, if we are 
analyzing a set with 6 variables, the correlation between two of them is tested 
conditioned on groups of the remaining variables. That is,  sepset 1 includes 5 
one-member sets (the empty set plus a 5 sets, each with one of the remaining 
                                                 
7
  A significance level of 0.20 is recommended at sample sizes less than 100. A significance level of 0.10 
is advised if the sample size is between 100 and 300. 
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4 variables). Sepset 2 includes 6 sets representing all possible combinations 
of 2 variables out of the 4 left for conditioning. And so forth. 
2. The Wald statistic is used instead of the Fisher statistic. 
 For this research, we used a truncated version of the PC algorithm and we also 
adopted Moneta’s redefinition of a Sepset without using a Wald statistic for this analysis 
because we are not analyzing VAR innovations. Appendix A presents the Moneta’s 
modified version of the PC Algorithm provided by Sprites et al. (2000: 84-85), where 
Moneta’s modifications appear in bold.  
 
4.3.3 Richardson’s Algorithm for Cyclic Graphs 
 We have only considered Directed Acyclic Graphs as opposed to Cyclic Graphs, 
which allow for a causal flow that eventually returns to the variable where the 
information first originated. Although Cyclic graphs are fundamentally different from 
Acyclic graphs, they both rely on d-separation, which Richardson (1996) used in an 
algorithm that allows to identify cyclic causal structures.  
 Richardson’s algorithm relies also on the same two assumptions as PC. If the 
probability distribution satisfies the Faithfulness and the Markov conditions, then there 
exists a set of equivalent graphs, Markov Equivalent, that can represent that probability 
distribution and have the same d-separation relations. The algorithm searches those 
features that are common to all the graphs in that set, and the final graph is generated. 
This graph is called a Partial Ancestral Graph (PAG) and consists of edges that connect 
all the vertices (or variables). Each edge is allowed to have two edge-endpoints from the  
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set {°,–, >} indicating respectively whether nothing can be inferred about the source and 
direction of the information; the information flows out of a variable, or into it. Figure 7  
presents the exact definition of a Partial Ancestral Graph as defined by Richardson  
(1996).  
 Although this algorithm would allow to identify simultaneous determination of 
prices (or perfect coordination between the supplier and the retailer), there is not much 
gain when considering only three variables. Unfortunately, only one of those steps adds 
more information than the PC algorithm. That step was included in our research and 
allowed us to also direct single edges instead of just colliders.  Appendix A presents the 
Figure 7  Partial Ancestral Graphs. ( Richardson, 1996) 

 is a PAG for Directed Cyclic Graph G with vertex set V, if and only if 
(i) There is an edge between A and B in  if and only if A and B are d-connected in G 
given all subsets W  V\{A,B}. 
(ii) If there is an edge in   out of A (not necessarily into B), A–* B, then A is an 
ancestor of B in every graph in Equiv(G). 
(iii) If there is an edge in   into B, A→B, then in every graph in Equiv(G), B is not an 
ancestor of A. 
(iv) If there is an underlining A*—*B*—*C in   then B is an ancestor of (at least one 
of) A or C in every graph in Equiv(G). 
(v) If there is an edge from A to B, and from C to B, (A → B ← C), then the arrow 
heads at B in   are joined by dotted underlining, thus A → B ← C, only if in every 
graph in Equiv(G), B is not a descendant of a common child of A and C. 
(vi) Any edge endpoint not marked in one of the above ways is left with a small circle 
thus: o—*. 
 



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complete algorithm which consists of seven steps. That version was used to analyze the 
relationship among the manufacturers in the case study provided in Section 5. The 
truncated version required for the analysis of only three variables is described below: 
1. Create a complete undirected graph. Every variable to be studied is connected 
to every other variable with undirected edges. 
2. Sequentially remove edges based on vanishing correlation or conditional 
correlation. If i, j, k are normally distributed and  kjir |,  is the sample 
conditional correlation of i and j given k, then      nkjirznkjiz ,|,,|,   
is standard normal, where  kji |,  is the correlation between variable i and 
j conditional on variable k, and |k| is the number of variables that we are 
conditioning on.  z  is the Fisher statistic given by Equation (81). 
3. Direct the surviving edges. Some variable(s) were used to condition the 
relationship in order to remove the edges. Such variable(s) are termed the 
sepset of the variables whose edge has been removed. The PC Algorithm 
directs an edge between X and Y into variable Z if Z is not in the sepset of X 
and Y. 
4. When considering three variables where only two of them are connected with 
an edge, then that edge can be directed. Consider X, Y, and Z where only Y 
and Z are connected by an edge. Then Z → Y if Y does not belong to 
Sepset(X, Z) and X is independent from Y when conditioning on Sepset(X, Z). 
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4.3.4 Customized Algorithm 
 Since we are using Fisher’s statistic (Equation 81) for all our tests, then the 
differences between the three previous algorithms is very subtle. Specifically, the 
Sepsets in the PC Algorithm are a subset of the Sepsets defined by Moneta (2008). 
Moreover, the PC Algorithm is a truncated version of Richardson’s Algorithm when 
only three variables are being considered. Therefore, the analysis of horizontal 
competition among manufacturers was conducted with the full version of Richardson’s 
Cyclical Graphs. However, both Richardson’s and Moneta’s algorithms were used 
whenever only three variables were considered in the analysis of vertical competition. 
For this reason, our customized algorithm starts by computing all the possible 
correlations and partial correlations and testing them for significance to generate a large 
matrix that contains all Moneta’s Sepsets. Then, the algorithm continues as Richardson’s 
but changes the Sepset definition and it is truncated even further when Moneta’s results 
are sought. The implemented algorithm follows whereas the complete algorithm is 
presented in the Appendix A: 
1. For all  pairs of vertices (yit, yjt), test unconditional and conditional 
correlations on all possible combinations of the remaining variables. Record 
results in a Matrix of Sepsets. If i, j, k are normally distributed and  kjir |,  
is the sample conditional correlation of i and j given k, then 
     nkjirznkjiz ,|,,|,   is standard normal, where  kji |,  is the 
correlation between variable i and j conditional on variable k, and |k| is the 
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number of variables that we are conditioning on.  z  is the Fisher statistic 
given by Equation (81). 
2. Create a complete undirected graph. That is, every variable to be studied is 
connected to every other variable with undirected edges. 
3. Sequentially remove edges based on vanishing correlation or conditional 
correlation.  
4. Direct the surviving edges. Some variable(s) were used to condition the 
relationship in order to remove the edges. Such variable(s) are termed the 
sepset of the variables whose edge has been removed. The algorithm directs 
an edge between X and Y into variable Z if Z is not in the sepset of X and Y. 
The definition of sepset is allowed to switch from its classical definition to 
Moneta’s depending on which analysis is being performed. 
5. When considering three variables where only two of them are connected with 
an edge, then that edge can be directed. Consider X, Y, and Z where only Y 
and Z are connected by an edge. Then Z → Y if Y does not belong to 
Sepset(X, Z) and X is independent from Y when conditioning on Sepset(X, Z). 
This step is not performed if the Moneta’s definition of a Sepset is used. 
 The theoretical framework used to analyze strategic behavior between competing 
firms is described in Section 4. Then, the models of causality and the differences among 
the various algorithms used, both cyclic and acyclic, were described. We concluded by 
presenting the algorithm actually used in this dissertation. This algorithm was written in 
Visual Basic and into a spreadsheet. This enabled us to automate the analysis of 96 
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different manufacturers. However, the analysis of competition among manufacturers was 
conducted with the use of Tetrad IV. We used the presented theoretical framework and 
models of causality to empirically elicit the presence of strategic behavior within a 
supply chain, and among its manufacturers. This analysis is described in the following 
section. 
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5. CASE STUDY 
 
 It was described in detail in Section 4 how strategic interactions between 
competitors can be modeled through the use of game theory and elicited with the use of 
causal models. In particular, we described in Subsection 4.1 how Cournot, Stackelberg, 
and Bertrand games of horizontal competition are usually analyzed for Nash 
equilibriums, and how the mathematical solutions imply dependencies that can be 
elicited through causal inference. This framework was extended to study the (vertical) 
relationship between a retailer and its suppliers. Thus, we described in Subsection 4.2 
the causal patterns associated to a perfect coordination of the supply chain, vertical 
Nash, Stackelberg leadership, and how the causal structures change in the presence of  
monopolistic competition by the retailer. 
 We provide a case study in this section. The data used for the empirical study, 
and how it was manipulated, is explained in the following subsection. We discuss in 
Subsection 5.2 the possible effects of aggregation. The analysis of the empirical results 
is offered in Subsection 5.3, and conclusions are offered in Subsection 5.4. 
 
5.1 DATA 
 As Slade (1992) explained, highly disaggregated data is required for the type of 
study defined here. For this reason, we used the publicly available Dominick's database, 
property of the James M. Kilts Center, University of Chicago Booth School of Business 
(Table 1). This is the same dataset that Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and  Vilcassim (2000) 
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used to analyze the vertical relationship between manufacturers and retailers by 
estimating a system of equations. The Dominick's database covers store-level scanner 
data collected in Chicago, Illinois, at Dominick's Finer Foods during the period from 
1989 to 1994. It includes the weekly sales of more than 3500 UPCs which are classified 
in 30 categories. The dataset contains the number of units sold, number of items bundled 
together, price, and gross margin for each of these items.  
 Following our analytical discussion in Section 4, the triplet of variables, {Pr,i, 
Pm,i, qi}, was created, where Pr,i is the retailer’s price of product i, Pm,i refers to the 
manufacturer’s price of product i, and qi are the quantities purchased by the retailer. 
Only the sales of store number 123 were analyzed to minimize our exposure to price 
discrimination implemented in different geographic zones. This store was chosen 
arbitrarily but within the metropolitan area. 
  Unfortunately, no information was recorded unless a product was sold. This led 
to the presence of several missing observations in the dataset which limited the 
usefulness of some of the products. This inconvenience was addressed by two different 
Table 1 Dominick's Finer Foods Database Categories.  (James M. Kilts 
Center, University of Chicago Booth School of Business) 
 
Analgesics Cereals Frozen Dinners Shampoos 
Bath Soap Cheeses Frozen Entrees Snack Crackers 
Bathroom Tissues Cigarettes Frozen Juices Soaps 
Beer Cookies Grooming Products Soft Drinks 
Bottled Juices Crackers Laundry Detergents Toothbrushes 
Canned Soup Dish Detergent Oatmeal Toothpastes 
Canned Tuna Fabric Softeners Paper Towels  
Category Front-end-candies Refrigerated Juices 
 
 
Note. Each category contains several products.  
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avenues. First,  we only analyzed those categories which were believed to have the most 
consumption. These categories are Beer, Cheese, Soft Drinks, Toilet Paper, and Tuna. 
Second, we aggregated those purchased quantities which were provided by the same 
manufacturer and calculated the average retailer and manufacturer prices per unit (e.g. 
dollars per ounces). Given that aggregation may induce further problems to the empirical 
analysis, a thorough discussion is provided in the following subsection, while the results 
of our case study are presented in Subsection 5.3. 
 Moreover, Dominick’s database attaches a different manufacturer identification 
number to some products which were supplied by the same companies. As discussed in 
Dhar et al.  (2005), the same manufacturer can provide several different brands, while 
each of the brands may be marketed differently. For this reason, we did not merge those 
categories. Indeed, we found evidence of a Manufacturer-Stackelberg for some products 
and a Retailer-Stackelberg for others, even though they were provided by the same 
company. 
 
5.2 NOTES ON AGGREGATION 
 We have discussed that aggregation of the data was required to deal with missing 
observations. Certainly, the Dominick’s database has no entries if a product was not sold 
during a week, resulting in a very low number of usable series. This is not a major 
concern when computing the correlations which lie at the heart of all of the algorithms 
used in causality analysis. However, correlations based on a small number of 
observations are not desired. This is because asymptotical statistical tests require large 
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amounts of data to consider their results valid. Hence, given that a manufacturer may 
pursue similar strategies for some products, an aggregated product may be used to 
generate the triplets discussed in Section 4.2. Therefore, the triplet {qi, Pr,i, Pm,i,} consists 
of the total quantities provided (and sold) by the same manufacturer regardless of the 
brand, the average price per unit charged by the retailer, and the average price per unit 
received by the manufacturer. This type of aggregation should not mask the true 
underlying behavior of the firms since we are aggregating over different products 
provided and marketed by the same firm to a single retailer. This should be true as long 
as each of the brands is subject to the same economic environment, and the expected 
returns provided by each brand are proportional to each other (Day, 1963). 
 Yet, it has been widely discussed that behavior at the individual level cannot 
always be expected to hold at the aggregated level (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
Although we are not analyzing  a consumer demand problem, it is not obvious whether 
the real causal pattern for a specific brand will be elicited when several products have 
been aggregated together. In this context, the demand literature addresses two types of 
aggregation. The first one studies aggregation across different commodities and 
intertemporal choices through the composite commodity theorem and its variations 
(Leontief, 1936; Theil 1956, 1971; Lewbel, 1996), as well as separability  and two stage 
budgeting (Leontief, 1947; Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). However, our aggregation 
takes place over weekly observations of different versions of the same commodity (e.g. 
coke in cans versus coke in bottle). Thus this is not a major concern. Nevertheless, the 
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second type of aggregation deals with grouping over consumers. This directly affects our 
study and a more detailed discussion is provided in subsection 5.2.2. 
 For these reasons, we studied the effects of aggregation on the algorithms used to 
elicit causal relationships in order to analyze whether aggregation may mask the true 
causal relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer. Each of these algorithms 
search for causal patterns by testing d-separation between variables with the use of the 
Fisher statistic shown in Equation (81). Therefore, we can reach our conclusions by 
determining whether the test statistic is increased (reduced) by aggregation and, as a 
result, gets rejected (not rejected) more than usual. Any changes on the test statistic 
would lead to the elicitation of a causal pattern different than that of the disaggregated 
data. We now proceed to describe the mathematical approach to this problem which 
results in unclear conclusions. Thereafter, we move forward by addressing the same 
problem with stochastic simulation where we conclude that aggregation has no effects 
on our analysis if the triplets to be aggregated have the same correlation matrix and are 
independent from each other. However, the correlations between the retailer’s price and 
the wholesale prices of the different brands provided by the same manufacturer are not 
constant. We discuss the theoretical implications of the findings. 
 
5.2.1 Mathematical Approach 
 There are only two aggregation rules used in this dissertation, although other 
rules may be studied
8
. The first one consists on computing simple averages for both the 
                                                 
8
 Nayga and Capps (1994) suggest to weight prices by quantity shares within an aggregated group. 
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retailer’s and the manufacturer’s price; 𝑝 𝑟 =  𝑝𝑟 ,𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1  and 𝑝 𝑚 =  𝑝 𝑚 ,𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1  respectively, 
where the index i denotes the different brands to be aggregated because they are 
provided by the same manufacturer. The other aggregation rule consists on adding all the 
units sold by the retailer, regardless of the brand, but provided by the same 
manufacturer; 𝑞 =  𝑞𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 . Generalizing, consider K different types of variables. Define 
xk a vector of realizations of the k
th
 type variable with dimension Tx1. Then, the squared 
partial correlation between x1 and x2 conditioned on x3 is given by: 
 𝜌2(𝒙1,𝒙2|𝒙3) =
 𝒙𝟏
∗ ′𝒙𝟐
∗  
2
 𝒙𝟏
∗ ′𝒙𝟏
∗   𝒙𝟐
∗ ′𝒙𝟐
∗  
 , (82) 
where x1
*
 and x2
*
 are the residuals obtained from regressing x1 and x2 on x3 and a 
constant. Defining 𝑾 =  𝜾  𝒙3  as the matrix composed by a vector of ones, 𝜾, of 
dimension Tx1, and x3, then the residual maker M = I – W(W’W) 
–1W’ can be used to 
rewrite Equation (82) as: 
 𝜌2(𝒙1,𝒙2|𝒙3) =
 𝒙𝟏
 ′𝑴𝒙𝟐 
2
 𝒙𝟏
 ′𝑴𝒙𝟏  𝒙𝟐
 ′𝑴𝒙𝟐 
 . (83) 
which has been reduced since M is symmetric and idempotent. Equation (83) presents 
the partial correlation coefficient of disaggregated data. Now consider the matrix Xk of 
dimension TxI in Equation (84) which represents I independent and identically 
distributed vectors, xi,k, of dimension 1xT of the k
th
 type:  
  𝑿𝑘 =  
𝑥1,1,𝑘 ⋯ 𝑥1,𝐼,𝑘
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑥𝑇 ,1 𝑘 ⋯ 𝑥𝑇,𝐼,𝑘
 . (84) 
Then, the I variables can be aggregated with averages by post-multiplying Xk times the 
unitary vector, 1, of dimension Ix1, and dividing by I, which is the level of aggregation: 
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 𝑿 𝑘 =
1
𝐼
𝑿𝑘𝟏 =
1
𝐼
 
 𝑥1,𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖
⋮
 𝑥𝑇,𝑖 ,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖
 . (85) 
On the other hand, aggregation through summation is achieved by multiplying Equation 
(85) times the level of aggregation I: 
 𝐼𝑿 𝑘 = 𝑿𝑘𝟏 =  
 𝑥1,𝑖 ,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖
⋮
 𝑥𝑇 ,𝑖,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖
 . (86) 
 Moreover, define  
  𝑾𝑨 =  𝜾  𝑿 𝑘 , (87) 
and 
  𝑾𝑩 =  𝜾  𝐼𝑿 𝑘  (88) 
as the matrices composed by a vector of ones, 𝜾, of dimension Tx1, and the I variables of 
the k
th
 type aggregated either by averaging as in Equation (85), or by summation as in 
Equation (86). Then, the residual maker matrices associated to Equations (87) and (88) 
respectively are: 
   𝑴𝑨 = 𝑰 − 𝑾𝑨(𝑾𝑨′𝑾𝑨)
−𝟏𝑾𝑨′  (89) 
and 
   𝑴𝑩 = 𝑰 − 𝑾𝑩(𝑾𝑩′𝑾𝑩)
−𝟏𝑾𝑩′ . (90) 
Thus, the squared partial correlation between 𝑿 𝑙  and 𝑿 𝑚  conditioned on 𝑿 𝑘  is: 
   𝜌2(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝑿 𝑚 |𝑿 𝑘) =
 𝟏′𝑿𝑙
′𝑴𝑨𝑿𝑚 𝟏 
𝟐
𝟏′𝑿𝑙
′𝑴𝑨𝑿𝑙𝟏𝟏′𝑿𝑚
′𝑴𝑨𝑿𝑚𝟏
 ,  (91) 
which has been reduced since MA is symmetric and idempotent. By the same method, 
the squared partial correlation between 𝑿 𝑙  and 𝑿 𝑚  conditioned on 𝐼𝑿 𝑘  is: 
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   𝜌2(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝑿 𝑚 |𝐼𝑿 𝑘) =
 𝟏′𝑿𝑙
′𝑴𝑩𝑿𝑚𝟏 
𝟐
𝟏′𝑿𝑙
′𝑴𝑩𝑿𝑙𝟏𝟏′𝑿𝑚
′𝑴𝑩𝑿𝑚 𝟏
 ,  (92) 
and finally, the squared partial correlation between 𝑿 𝑙  and 𝐼𝑿 𝑚  conditioned on 𝑿 𝑘  is: 
   𝜌2(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝐼𝑿 𝑚 |𝑿 𝑘) =
 𝟏′𝑿𝑙
′𝑴𝑨𝑿𝑚 𝟏 
𝟐
𝟏′𝑿𝑙
′𝑴𝑨𝑿𝑙𝟏𝟏′𝑿𝑚
′𝑴𝑨𝑿𝑚𝟏
 .  (93) 
 Unfortunately, comparing Equations (91) to (93) with Equation (83) does not 
yield unambiguous evidence of the effect of aggregation on the partial correlation.  This 
is because the term in parenthesis in Equations (89) and (90) cannot be reduced any 
further due to WA and WB being non square matrices.  
 
5.2.2 Stochastic Simulations 
 The previous results imply that the effect of aggregation on the Fisher statistic 
cannot be easily observed through an analytical derivation of the test statistic. For this 
reason, we addressed this problem through stochastic simulation. However, we imposed 
a very strong assumption. We presumed that the relationship between the consumer, 
retailer, and manufacturer is independent for each brand to be aggregated. This implies 
that the manufacturer and the retailer will independently pursue the same strategies for 
each of the brands that fit in a certain group. This supposition is not very restrictive of 
the firms’ behavior since those brands marketed differently can be aggregated in 
different groups.  
 However, the same assumption implies that the consumers’ choice of quantity is 
influenced only by his relationship with the retailer and the manufacturer, and it is 
independent from the other brands to be grouped together. This notion can be very 
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limiting. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, pp149-166) address exact aggregation by 
discussing the usually strict necessary conditions in which the aggregated behavior can 
represent the actions of its constituents. In particular, they show that if the average of the 
consumers’ individual demand functions for a particular good is to be represented by a 
single aggregate average market demand function, such function would imply that the 
marginal propensities to spend have to be identical for every consumer, which, of 
course, is not true. The average market demand thus has to be a function of the average 
total expenditure. This in turn implies that the individual consumer demand functions 
must be linear in each household’s total expenditure, associated to quasi-homothetic 
preferences along with straight Engel curves with a constant slope across individuals, 
which are very rigorous, although not impossible for undifferentiated products. 
Generalized Linearity achieves exact non linear aggregation by aggregating over the 
expenditure patterns instead of quantities. Although this methodology results in Engel 
curves that need not to be straight, they need to be linearly related. Moreover, the use of 
a representative consumer is required, which brings other theoretical considerations 
studied by welfare economists. 
 Nevertheless, retailers should price in response to aggregate demand functions. 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) added that the methods discussed above render functional 
forms that are too specific to model actual behavior. However, less strict conditions can 
be achieved if the aggregate demand function is not expected to be consistent with utility 
maximization. In particular, the aggregated demand function should be determined by 
the shape of the Engel curves when all the consumers face the same prices. Then, 
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holding constant the distribution of expenditures across individuals, the summation or 
average of individual demands can be represented by a single function of prices and 
average expenditure. This aggregate function will only need to satisfy the adding up and 
homogeneity restrictions of demand theory. Thus, in general, the micro and macro 
functional forms need not to be similar. Deaton and Muellbauer emphasize this as the 
reason why welfare economists should be very cautious when making inferences about  
microeconomic behavior based on macroeconomic observations. 
 Let the vector xt,i consist of three observations, (xt,i,k, xt,i,l, xt,i,m )’, from a 
Multivariate Normal Distribution with mean  and Variance-Covariance matrix . Then, 
redefine Xt as an independent and identically distributed sample of size I of the vector 
xt,i: 
  𝑿𝑡 =  
𝑥𝑡 ,1,𝑘 ⋯ 𝑥𝑡 ,𝐼,𝑘
𝑥𝑡 ,1,𝑙 ⋱ 𝑥𝑡 ,𝐼,𝑙
𝑥𝑡 ,1 𝑚 ⋯ 𝑥𝑡 ,𝐼,𝑚
 .  
Let 1be a vector of ones with dimension i 1. Then, 
 𝑿𝑡𝟏 =  
 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑖 ,𝑘
𝐼
𝑖
 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑖 ,𝑙
𝐼
𝑖
 𝑥𝑡 ,𝑖 ,𝑚
𝐼
𝑖
 ,  
 E 𝑿𝑡𝟏 =  
𝐼𝜇𝑘
𝐼𝜇𝑙
𝐼𝜇𝑚
 , 
and 
 Var 𝑿𝑡𝟏 = E  𝑿𝑡𝟏 − E 𝑿𝑡𝟏   𝑿𝑡𝟏 − E 𝑿𝑡𝟏  ′  
 = ΣiΣjE  𝒙𝑡,𝑖 − 𝝁𝑖  𝒙𝑡 ,𝑗 − 𝝁𝑗  ′ . 
But since i  j , then the covariance between vectors i ≠ j equals zero. Therefore, 
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 = ΣiΣjE  𝒙𝑡,𝑖 − 𝝁𝑖  𝒙𝑡 ,𝑗 − 𝝁𝑗  ′  
 = ΣiE  𝒙𝑡,𝑖 − 𝝁𝑖  𝒙𝑡 ,𝑖 − 𝝁𝑖 ′ = 𝐼𝚺. 
These results facilitate the imposition of the two different aggregation rules that we have 
discussed. Define the linear combinations matrix C as 
 𝑪 =  
1
𝑎 0 0
0 1 𝑏 0
0 0 1 𝑐 
 , 
where a, b, and c are constants to be defined later. Then, 
 E 𝑪𝑿𝑡𝟏 = 𝑪E 𝑿𝑡𝟏 =  
𝐼
𝑎 𝜇𝑘
𝐼
𝑏 𝜇𝑙
𝐼
𝑐 𝜇𝑚
   (94) 
and 
  Var 𝑪𝑿𝑡𝟏 = 𝑪
′Var 𝑿𝑡𝟏 𝑪 = 𝐼𝑪𝚺𝑪 . (95) 
 The stochastic simulations are therefore generated as a Multivariate Normal 
Distribution with expected value and Variance-Covariance matrix given by Equations 
(94) and (95) respectively. Notice that the linear combinations matrix C allows us to 
impose the desired aggregation rules. In particular, making a = 1, and b = c = I leads to 
the scenario where the variable of type k has been aggregated by summation, whereas 
the variables of types l and m have been aggregated with averages. Each triplet was 
generated one thousand times (T = 1,000) to study the effect of increasing I on both the 
unconditional correlation and the Fisher statistic’s distribution at two different levels of 
correlation imposed through the  matrix. In every case, the expected value is set to be  
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zero and unit standard deviations are imposed to equate the Variance-Covariance matrix 
to the Correlation matrix. Two different scenarios were analyzed for each experiment. 
The first scenario studies the effects of aggregation when there is zero 
correlation/covariance among the variables, whereas the second scenario studies the 
effect of aggregation when the correlation/covariance between the triplets is big (Figure 
8). Note that the correlation/covariance between the first variable and the rest was 
imposed to be negative to account for normal goods. These simulations were generated 
with Simetar Lite 2008. The results follow. 
 Table 2 displays the effects on the Fisher statistic and the unconditional 
correlation after increasing the correlation structure and the aggregation level. The table 
is divided into 5 sections. Table 2.a shows the scenario when aggregation with averages 
is used in all three variables (i.e. 𝑿 𝑙 , 𝑿 𝑚 , and 𝑿 𝑘). It shows that there is no change in the 
Fisher distributional statistics as I is increased from 1 (no aggregation) to 50 (big 
aggregation) regardless of the level of correlation in the data. For instance, in the case of 
a zero correlation structure, the standard deviation of the Fisher statistic remains at 0.99 
units as the level of aggregation, I, is increased. Similarly, when highly correlated series 
are   generated,   the   standard   deviation   of  the  Fisher  statistic  remains  at  1  as  the 
Figure 8 Simulated Variance-Covariance Structures. 
 
𝚺 =  
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
   
 
a) Uncorrelated Structure 
 
𝚺 =  
1 −0.8 −0.8
−0.8 1 0.8
−0.8 0.8 1
   
 
b) Highly Correlated Structure. 
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Table 2 Effects of Aggregation on the Fisher Statistic and the Unconditional 
Correlation. 
   
Integration Level (I) 
  Uncorrelated Series  Highly Correlated Series 
 I=1 I=10 I=50  I=1 I=10 I=50 
 
a) Fisher statistic based on 𝜌(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝑿 𝑚 |𝑿 𝑘) 
 
 Mean -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  15.10 15.10 15.10 
 StDev 0.99 0.99 0.99  1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Min -2.82 -2.82 -2.82  12.09 12.09 12.09 
 Max 2.88 2.88 2.88  17.92 17.92 17.92 
         
b) Fisher statistic based on 𝜌(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝑿 𝑚 |𝐼𝑿 𝑘) 
 Mean 0.0 0.0 0.0  15.10 15.10 15.10 
 StDev 1.0 1.0 1.0  1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Min -2.8 -2.8 -2.8  12.09 12.09 12.09 
 Max 2.9 2.9 2.9  17.92 17.92 17.92 
         
c) Fisher statistic based on 𝜌(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝐼𝑿 𝑚 |𝑿 𝑘) 
 Mean -0.02 -0.02 -0.02  15.10 15.10 15.10 
 StDev 0.99 0.99 0.99  1.00 1.00 1.00 
 Min -2.82 -2.82 -2.82  12.09 12.09 12.09 
 Max 2.88 2.88 2.88  17.92 17.92 17.92 
         
d) Corr(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝑿 𝑚 ) 
 Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 
 StDev 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 Min -0.08 -0.08 -0.08  -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 
 Max 0.09 0.09 0.09  -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 
         
e) Corr(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝐼𝑿 𝑚) 
 Mean 0.00 0.00 0.00  -0.80 -0.80 -0.80 
 StDev 0.03 0.03 0.03  0.01 0.01 0.01 
 Min -0.08 -0.08 -0.08  -0.83 -0.83 -0.83 
 Max 0.09 0.09 0.09  -0.76 -0.76 -0.76 
         
Note. 𝑿 = (𝚺𝐢𝑿𝒊)/𝑰 , where XiR
3
 ~ MVN(0,);   as in Figure 8. 
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 aggregation level is increased. Table 2.b displays the descriptive statistics associated to 
the distribution of the Fisher statistic calculated for a conditional correlation whose 
conditional variable has been treated with a different aggregation rule. In particular, the 
conditional variable has been  aggregated by summation only, whereas the remaining 
variables have been aggregated by averaging (i.e. 𝜌(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝑿 𝑚 |𝐼𝑿 𝑘)). The simulations 
show that the Fisher statistic distribution does not change with different levels of 
aggregation regardless of the correlated structures. The same conclusions are reached in 
Tables 2.c, 2.d, and 2.e which present the results of  the same analysis over the Fisher 
statistic associated with 𝜌(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝐼𝑿 𝑚 |𝑿 𝑘)), and the unconditional correlations 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝑿 𝑚 ) and 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑿 𝑙 , 𝐼𝑿 𝑚 ), respectively.  
 These results indicate that the Fisher statistic remains unchanged when 
independent observations of a 3-variable Multivariate Normal distributed vector are 
aggregated by adding or averaging across different samples. This in turn implies that the 
algorithms would render the same causal pattern regardless of aggregation when the 
conditions mentioned above are met. However, those assumptions are very restrictive in 
particular with respect to consumer behavior. 
 
5.2.3 Conclusions on Aggregation 
 We discussed in Subsection 5.2 that aggregation of the data was required to deal 
with missing observations. Although missing observations are not a major concern when 
computing the correlations which lie at the heart of all of the algorithms used in causality 
analysis,  they do affect the size of the sample and therefore the reliability of our results. 
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For this reason, given that a manufacturer may pursue similar marketing strategies for 
some products, an aggregated product may be used to generate the triplet discussed in 
Subsection 4.2. Yet, it is not obvious whether the real causal pattern for a specific brand 
will be elicited when several products have been aggregated together.  
 This problem was analyzed through a mathematical approach. However, no clear 
insights were discovered. For this reason, the aggregation problem was explored through 
the stochastic simulation of a Multivariate Normal distributed vector of three variables 
which was subject to the two different aggregation rules used in this Dissertation. 
Assuming that the strategic relationship between the retailer and a manufacturer is 
independent for each of the manufacturer’s brand, and therefore the same variance-
covariance structure for each of the brands that will be aggregated, we concluded that 
aggregation does not influence the size of our test statistics and therefore the causal 
patterns remain unchanged. However, this assumption also implies that all the patrons of 
Dominick’s Finer Foods act independently towards any of the brands being grouped 
together. This notion has been challenged by the demand theory literature because of its 
implications on the shape of the consumers’ expansion paths, although empirical 
characterization of the aggregated demand function can be obtained if this market 
function is not expected to be consistent with utility maximization (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980). 
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5.3  CASE STUDY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 The results of the empirical analysis of the Dominick’s database are described in 
this section. We analyzed only those categories believed to have more traffic in order to 
reduce the number of missing observations. Namely, we analyzed Beer, Cheese, Soft 
Drinks, Toilet Paper, and Tuna. Each of these groups contains several manufacturers, 
which in turn are providers of several brands in numerous presentations. Each product is 
classified by a UPC number which identifies any specific item by its last five digits, 
while the remaining digits identify the manufacturer. Nevertheless, there may be items 
produced by the same company and yet are labeled with a different manufacturer 
number.  We interpreted this as groups of products that are marketed differently. A list 
of these manufacturers and a description of their products is shown in the Appendix B. 
 Only one store location was studied, Store 123, in order to avoid errors due to 
zone price discrimination. The data was first aggregated by manufacturer in each 
category. Both the manufacturer price and the retailer price were aggregated by 
averaging the per unit price of each product, while the quantities were aggregated in 
three different ways. Therefore, three triplets were generated for each manufacturer; {qi
A
, 
Pr,i, Pm,i,}A, {qi
B
, Pr,i, Pm,i,}B, {qi
C
, Pr,i, Pm,i,}C, where qi
A
 represents the total units sold for 
manufacturer i, qi
B
 represents the total number of discount coupons used to purchase the 
products of manufacturer i, and qi
C
 represents the percent of the total sales of products 
supplied by the manufacturer i that were purchased with coupons. Pr,i and  Pm,i represent 
the per unit average price for the retailer and the manufacturer in all instances.  
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 In Section 5.2, we discussed that aggregation by sum or averages will not affect 
our causal patterns if a) the manufacturer-retailer relationship is independent, and b) 
similar strategies are pursued for each of the brands provided by the same manufacturer 
(i.e. same Variance-Covariance matrix). Hence, our aggregation occurs by manufacturer 
as they are identified by the UPC of each product. However, we found that the 
correlation between the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s stationary price is not constant 
across those brands provided by the same manufacturer. Moreover, these correlations 
tend to move widely across the [-1, 1] spectrum (Table 3). This may partially explain 
why we failed to find unambiguous causal patterns in many instances. Nevertheless, the 
correlations tend to cluster for some of the brands implying a closer relationship among 
them, but an automated cluster analysis of products for each manufacturer seems 
unpractical since the number of clusters is unknown and tends to vary. We now discuss 
this in more detail before we continue with the description of our empirical analysis. 
 
 
Table 3 
 
Distributions of the Disaggregated Brands’ Correlation Among 
their Retailer and Manufacturer Stationary Prices. 
Category/ 
 
Correlations 
Manufacturer Representative Products Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     BEER 
     m1 Budweiser/Michelob 0.44 0.53 -1.00 1.00 
m4 Miller 0.33 0.41 -1.00 1.00 
m6 
Augsburguer/Old 
Milwakee 
-0.10 0.56 -0.94 0.27 
m7 Labatta 0.81 . 0.81 0.81 
m8 Molson 0.47 0.35 -0.01 0.85 
m10 
Coors/Keystone/Blue 
Moon 
0.52 0.14 0.33 0.72 
m11 Strohs 0.43 0.27 0.21 0.72 
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Table 3 Continued. 
    Category/ 
 
Correlations 
Manufacturer Representative Products Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
m12 
Pilsner/Moosehead/Dos 
Equis 
0.44 0.53 -0.06 1.00 
m13 Heineken 0.35 0.41 -0.21 0.67 
m14 Old Style 0.48 0.47 -0.66 1.00 
m15 Corona 0.62 0.19 0.44 0.81 
m18 Beck's 0.63 0.20 0.47 0.98 
m20 Berghoff/Augsburguer 0.36 0.33 0.17 0.73 
m22 Samuel Adams 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.09 
m25 Goose Island Honkers 0.01 . 0.01 0.01 
m27 Oregon Brewery India -0.96 . -0.96 -0.96 
      CHEESE 
     m1 Cty Ln Colby Mild 0.24 0.19 0.04 0.59 
m3 Lifeway's Farmer's C 0.01 . 0.01 0.01 
m4 Kraft Colby 1/3 Less 0.40 0.29 -0.68 1.00 
m9 Lol Cheddarella Chee 0.25 0.17 0.01 0.43 
m12 Dom Amer Chs Food Tw 0.16 0.13 -0.21 0.38 
m14 Frigo Shred Ched 0.49 0.73 -0.03 1.00 
m15 Laughing Cow/Bonbel 0.30 0.21 0.15 0.45 
m16 Lean N' Free /Alpine 0.31 0.14 0.16 0.48 
m17 Treasure Cave Square 0.16 0.23 -0.01 0.32 
m18 Sargento Wafer Thin 0.40 0.20 -0.06 0.74 
m19 Borden Lt Ln Chdr 0.12 0.23 -0.07 0.51 
      SOFT DRINKS 
    m2 Old Town Nat Sltzer 0.24 0.53 -0.25 0.80 
m3 Tetley Iced Tea W/Le -0.15 . -0.15 -0.15 
m4 Pepsi-Cola Cans 0.39 0.30 -0.25 0.98 
m5 Schwepps Tonic N/R 0.35 0.19 0.08 0.69 
m6 Canada Dry Ginger Al 0.70 0.25 -0.22 0.98 
m7 Hawaiian Punch Gldn 0.90 0.04 0.87 0.99 
m8 Fruitopia Citrus Con 0.33 0.30 0.06 0.81 
m9 Royal Crown Cola 0.32 0.32 -0.32 0.96 
m11 Ocean Spry 0.59 0.23 0.04 0.76 
m12 World Classics Cola 0.27 0.21 -0.01 0.56 
m13 Dominick's Cola 3 Lt 0.25 0.12 0.02 0.61 
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Table 3 Continued. 
    Category/ 
 
Correlations 
Manufacturer Representative Products Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
      m14 Liptn Brew Wild Strw 0.33 0.31 -0.46 0.64 
m15 PS 1.00 . 1.00 1.00 
m16 Nu Grape Soda Ppd 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.48 
m17 Crush Different Flavors 0.53 0.20 0.30 0.86 
m18 Country Time 0.51 0.23 0.00 0.78 
m19 Sunkist 0.48 0.23 0.00 0.75 
m21 Coca-Cola 0.46 0.37 -0.98 0.98 
m22 New York Seltzer 1.00 . 1.00 1.00 
m23 Hawiian Punch Red 8p 0.10 0.24 -0.35 0.32 
m24 
Hawaiian Punch /Sunny 
Delight 
0.57 0.26 0.14 0.98 
m26 Sundance Black Curra 0.40 . 0.40 0.40 
m27 Dr Pepper Sugar Free 0.59 0.24 0.27 0.98 
m28 Clearly Canadian 0.64 0.19 0.40 1.00 
m29 A & W Root Beer (Can 0.39 0.30 -0.11 0.94 
m31 Boku 0.51 0.05 0.47 0.54 
m32 Vernors / Artic Twist 0.58 0.24 0.33 0.88 
m33 Barq's Root Beer 0.48 0.49 -0.46 0.91 
m34 Dad's Root Beer Tria 0.50 0.27 0.05 0.99 
m35 Ibc Root Beer Trial 0.23 0.00 0.23 0.23 
m36 Holy Cow -1.00 . -1.00 -1.00 
m37 Seagram's Ginger Ale 0.18 0.15 -0.03 0.40 
m38 Lacroix Orange Miner 0.34 0.48 -1.00 0.78 
m40 Perrier Berry Nr 0.25 . 0.25 0.25 
m41 C/G Reg Sprk Mineral 0.58 0.13 0.30 0.71 
m43 Snapple Peach Tea 0.55 0.21 -0.11 0.76 
m44 Welch Grape 0.02 0.57 -0.64 0.40 
m46 A W Cream Soda Reg 0.24 0.32 -0.17 0.54 
m47 7-Up 0.61 0.27 0.05 0.99 
m51 Canfield Fruit Punch 0.29 0.27 -0.07 0.76 
m53 Nestea 6pk Cans 0.25 0.38 -0.07 0.74 
m56 Mistic 0.35 0.45 -0.03 1.00 
      TOILET PAPER 
    m1 Angel Sft Bth Tissue 0.40 0.52 -0.25 1.00 
m2 Kleenex Pp1.09 0.34 0.19 0.08 0.65 
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Table 3 Continued. 
    Category/ 
 
Correlations 
Manufacturer Representative Products Average Std. Dev. Min Max 
      m3 Charmin Bath Tissue 0.26 0.41 -0.60 0.66 
m4 Dominick's 2ply Pr B 0.16 0.40 -0.22 0.58 
m5 Northern Quilted Tis 0.53 0.20 0.27 1.00 
m6 Kleenex Cottonell Ba 0.49 0.23 0.00 0.82 
m7 Generic Bath Tissue -0.03 . -0.03 -0.03 
      
       
 As we mentioned above, the correlation between the manufacturer’s and the 
retailer’s price is not constant across the different brands provided by the same 
manufacturer. But a cluster analysis of these correlations would help to classify those 
products that seem to be marketed similarly. Nevertheless, the erroneous identification 
of these clusters would lead to misleading conclusions. As an example, we analyzed the 
aggregation of those products supplied by Miller, which is the manufacturer identified as 
m4 in the Beer category (Table 3). More specifically, we generated the dendrogram 
shown in Figure 9 by using the Euclidean distance based average dissimilarity of the 
UPCs’ correlations to identify those products that tend to group together (Johnson and 
Wichern, 1998). Examination of Figure 9 led us to aggregate the UPCs in 7 clusters 
using the k-means method (Table 4).  
 It is evident that those UPCs that tend to behave similarly are precisely those of 
comparable brands and size or presentation (Table 4). Thereafter, a causality analysis of 
those clusters was individually conducted using only the triplet generated by addition of 
the  consumer  quantities.  Only  the cluster  number two yielded an unambiguous causal  
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pattern which was the same causal pattern found when all the brands were aggregated 
together as a single triplet. Unfortunately, incorrect identification of the appropriate 
number of clusters may lead to misleading results. For instance, reducing the number of 
clusters from 7 to 6 in the example above leads to no identifiable causal patterns. We 
now continue to describe the analysis of the aggregated triplets. 
 Once the triplets per manufacturer were computed, each of the series were 
analyzed for stationarity using a Dickey Fuller test for random walks with a constant 
mean but without drift at the 0.05% significance level, to avoid spurious results  (Bessler  
Figure 9 Identification of the Correlation Clusters for Miller Beers. 
 
 
 
Note. Graph calculated with STATA 10.1. (StataCorp, 2007) 
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Table 4 Classification of Miller’s UPCs by Nonhierarchical Clusters. 
Cluster UPC Brand Ounces  Cluster UPC Brand Ounces 
    
 
    1 3410052505 Leinenkugel Limited 72  3 3410057528 Miller Lite Beer N.R 144 
1 3410070505 Miller Resever Amber 72  4 3410007602 Milwaukee's Best Lig 144 
2 3410000382 Miller Lite Beer N.R 32  4 3410067528 Miller Red Dog Nr Bt 144 
2 3410000581 Miller Genuine Draft 32  4 3410062306 Miller Icehouse Cans 288 
2 3410000154 Milwaukee's Best Bee 72  5 3410010602 Sharps Non-Alcoholic 144 
2 3410017525 Miller Genuine Draft 72  5 3410007306 Milwaukee's Best Lig 288 
2 3410057525 Miller Lite Beer N.R 72  5 3410067306 Miller Red Dog Cans 288 
2 3410001602 Miller High Life Bee 144  6 3410000031 Miller High Life N.R 32 
2 3410031602 Milwaukee's Best Bee 144  6 3410000004 Miller High Life Bee 72 
3 3410000554 Miller Genuine Draft 72  6 3410000354 Miller Lite Beer 72 
3 3410000904 Miller Genuine Draft 72  6 3410001306 Miller High Life Bee 288 
3 3410001505 Miller High Life Lnn 72  6 3410015306 Miller Genuine Drft 288 
3 3410015505 Miller Gen Drft Lt L 72  6 3410017306 Miller Genuine Draft 288 
3 3410017505 Miller Gen Drft Lnnr 72  6 3410057306 Miller Lite Beer 288 
3 3410057505 Miller Lite Longneck 72  7 3410032505 Miller Reserve Lnnr 72 
3 3410001528 Miller High Life N.R 144  
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and Kling, 1984). If the series were found to be non-stationary, then differences, 
logarithms, or differences of the logarithms were taken to achieve stationarity. Only 
those stationary triplets with the same integration order were studied. Alas, not all of the 
series survive this process and therefore many manufacturers were left out of the study.  
 Moreover, many of these series had blocks of missing observations. This affected 
our methodology in two ways. First, some series cannot be made stationary because 
taking differences, or log differences, will never solve the problem. Second, a significant 
level of 0.05 is not adequate for small sample sizes. Because the Directed Graphs 
algorithms rely only on correlations, discontinuities in the data are not a problem as long 
as the series survive the stationary tests. But the length of the series is important for the 
accuracy of our statistical tests. Therefore, those series that had less than 30 observations 
were discarded. Further adjustments were required to improve the reliability of our 
results. These are described below and Appendix C provides a list of those 
manufacturers that have been excluded from the study. 
  Finally, the three different triplets per manufacturer were analyzed through both 
the Moneta’s algorithm (Moneta, 2008) and a truncated version of the Richardson’s 
algorithm (Richardson, 1996), written in Visual Basic (VBA) as a macro in MS Excel 
2007; both reviewed in Subsection 4.3 and described in detail in Appendix A. Both of 
these algorithms rely on normally distributed data through the use of the Fisher Statistic 
(Equation 81). Although our series frequently rejected normality with Shapiro-Wilk 
tests, our aggregation methods imply asymptotic normality on all of our series through 
the use of the Central Limit Theorem; further requiring large datasets. Closer inspection 
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of the p-values associated to the Fisher Statistic revealed that these p-values tend to be 
either absolutely small, or absolutely big, leading to no ambiguous significance tests. 
Indeed, changing the significance level to 1%, 5%, 10%, and 20% lead to no significant 
changes in the results. Therefore, the algorithms ran with a 20% significance level for 
those series that had less than 100 hundred observations, and 5% for the rest. 
 Once the different causal patterns were obtained, they were classified by type. 
Although there are 25 potential causal relationships among the three variables (Figure 
10), both algorithms start by identifying colliders (structures 13, 19, and 21 in Figure 
10), which are later used to direct the remaining causal relationships. But the presence of 
a collider implies that there must be only two edges. Therefore only undirected 
relationships and colliders could be identified. The theoretical model discussed in 
Subsection 4.2 implies that structures 13, 19, and 21 are respectively associated to a 
Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and retailer’s monopolistic behavior 
with vertical coordination. Nevertheless, Richardson’s algorithm contains one extra step 
that allowed us to identify one edge structures without requiring the previous 
identification of colliders. This step enabled us to identify structures 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9.  
 None of these have ambiguity in spotting a market leader. 
 The problem of identifying more structures through different means has already 
been studied. Haigh and Bessler (2004) used the Schwarz loss metrics to provide support 
for the Observational Equivalence Theorem which states that DAG’s that have the same 
skeletons   and   converging   edges   are  equivalent. This implies that either background  
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information, more variables, or both, must be added to the model. Here, we could rely on 
economic theory which suggests that the value of a product comes from its abundance  
(making it cheaper and therefore increasing demand) or scarcity (making it more 
expensive and therefore decreasing demand). Consequently, although the algorithms 
Figure 10 Possible Causal Relationships among the Manufacturer’s Price 
(Pmi), Retailer’s Price (Pri), and Quantity Sold (qi). (Haigh and 
Bessler, 2004) 
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cannot distinguish a causal fork (X ← Y → Z) from a causal chain (X→ Y → Z) when 
only three variables are studied, we can infer that the consumer quantity is always a 
causal source, making it possible to direct as causal chains those relationships where qi 
is at one extreme of a two-edge structure (qi → Y → Z). Unfortunately, this relationship 
cannot be assumed with absolute certainty. In particular, we concluded that the presence 
of monopolistic power can lead to the interpretation of consumption quantities as causal 
sinks (Figure 5). Moreover, our algorithms are unable to detect simultaneous 
determination or perfect coordination of the supply chain (X ↔ Y). Otherwise, any 
undirected structures of two edges with quantity at an extreme could be directed as 
structures 17 or 23 in Figure 10. 
 The results of our empirical analysis are presented in Appendix D and E, while a 
discussion follows. Interestingly, although the algorithms were more likely to identify a 
causal pattern when the quantities have been aggregated by sum, qi
A
, some of the causal 
patterns were elicited through one type of aggregation but not through the others. This is 
because two of the three aggregation rules over the consumer quantities focused their 
attention only on those products that were offered with a discount through the use of 
coupons, thus reducing the volatility of that sample. Nevertheless, the two different 
algorithms find supporting causal patterns for the three differently aggregated triplets 
except for two instances. While the Moneta Algorithm proved to be the most 
conservative, identifying fewer causal patterns, it was this algorithm which twice 
determined opposite causal directions for the same manufacturer when analyzing its 
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three different triplets. However, the Richardson’s Algorithm and the Moneta’s 
Algorithm produced conflicting results only once out of the 93 analyzed manufacturers.  
 Moreover, causality was successfully determined for 60% of our sample. The 
Cheese category yielded unambiguous causal patterns for 73% of its manufacturers, 
whereas the lowest success ratio came from the Toilet Paper group with 43%. These are 
very high numbers considering the shortcomings in our dataset and the limits of our 
algorithms. Further, our results indicate that 70% of those unambiguous causal patterns 
elicit Manufacturer Stackelberg relationships, 25% elicit Retailer Stackelbergs, and only 
5% elicit a monopolistic retailer with vertical coordination. A summary of these results 
are presented in Table 4, whereas the complete results are provided in the Appendix D. 
 These results are consistent with the market structure of the early 90s, when this 
sample was taken. At that time, the retail industry was highly fragmented so 
manufacturers tended to lead the prices. In addition, this period of time was 
characterized by the manufacturers’ effort to increase profits due to an abundance of 
meaningless products, lack of innovation, and fewer private labels. A different scenario 
may be uncovered in more recent data because the market is dominated by fewer than 10 
retailers, which enables them to resist the manufacturers’ pricing policies9.  
 On the other hand, Kadiyali et al.  (2000) discussed that an increasing amount of 
retailers gained larger proportions of the profits earned by a supply chain during these 
times,  suggesting  more retailer ―power‖ within the channel. They attributed this change  
                                                 
9
 Thanks to Mr. Stew Bishop, president of Consumer Marketing Group, Inc., and M.S. Jeff Lovering, 
Director of the same company, for their valuable insights. 
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Table 5              Summary of Empirical Results. 
 
CAUSAL PATTERNS Beer Cheese Soft Drinks Toilet Paper Tuna Total 
Total number of directed structures 13 8 22 3 10 56 
Total number of manufacturers 19 11 40 7 16 93 
Proportion of directed structures 68% 73% 58% 43% 63% 60% 
       Structure: Monopolistic Retailer with vertical coordination (Pm → q ← Pr)       
Total 2 1 0 0 0 3 
Proportion of the total number of manufacturers 11% 9% 0% 0% 0% 3% 
Proportion of the total directed structures found 15% 13% 0% 0% 0% 5% 
       Structure: Manufacturer Stackelberg (q → Pr ← Pm)         
 Total 10 4 15 2 8 39 
Proportion of the total number of manufacturers 53% 36% 38% 29% 50% 42% 
Proportion of the total directed structures found 77% 50% 68% 67% 80% 70% 
       Structure: Retailer Stackelberg (Pr → Pm ← q or Pr → Pm)       
 Total 1 3 7 1 2 14 
Proportion of the total number of manufacturers 5% 27% 18% 14% 13% 15% 
Proportion of the total directed structures found 8% 38% 32% 33% 20% 25% 
       Undirected Structures           
 Total 6 3 17 4 6 36 
Proportion of the total number of manufacturers 32% 27% 43% 57% 38% 39% 
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to intense competition among manufacturers, the introduction of high quality private 
labels, and an increasing number of products along with a decreasing number of retailers 
and shelf space. Nevertheless, their study acknowledges the existence of empirical 
studies that provide support against these arguments.  
 Furthermore, our results are also consistent in regards with the low presence of 
monopolistic activities with supply chain coordination (Figure 5; Table 5). McGuire and 
Staelin (1983, 1986), and Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989) showed that perfect 
coordination is not the best alternative for manufacturers of highly substitutable 
products. In particular, all of our categories pertain to products from highly competitive 
markets. Yet, monopolies with supply chain coordination were only elicited for one 
cheese and two beer providers. Both beer brands, Labatt and Foster’s, are perceived as 
expensive imports with successful product differentiation through branding. However, 
none of these brands holds more than 1% of the market share. Nevertheless, Foster’s 
does provide Dominicks’ with the second largest profit margin among all beers, while 
Labatt provides an average profit margin of 16%, which is bigger than that of either 
Miller, Michelob, Budweiser, and Old Style which together posses 85% of the total 
market share. Furthermore, the cheese brand which is associated to a monopolistic game 
with supply chain coordination is marketed as a Dominick’s private label, which may be 
a clear signal of channel partnerships. Moreover, this private label provides Dominicks 
with the largest profit margin and the second largest market share, 64% and 28% 
respectively. This profit margin is almost twice as big as the 36% provided by Kraft, 
whose market share is the biggest and doubles that of the private label.  
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 Another interesting observation can be found when comparing our results with 
those of  Kadiyali et al.  (2000). Their study of tuna, with the same dataset as ours,  
suggested that the retailer appropriates a larger share of the channel profits, which they 
refer to as ―pricing power‖. Although they did not determine price leadership, they 
concluded that the retailer retains more than 50% of the channel profits obtained from 
Chicken of the Sea, Starkist, and BumbleBee. The authors of that study find it surprising 
because of the absence of a private level in this market and explained this finding by 
describing high competition experienced both at the retailer and manufacturer level. In 
particular, Chicken of the Sea (COS) seems to be the most sensitive brand to 
competition. On the other hand, Kadiyali et al. determined that the margins of these 
brands elicit deviations from a Bertrand - Nash equilibrium. Our study suggests that the 
manufacturers hold price leadership on all three brands. It is worth mentioning that 
although Starkist holds price leadership with its Solid White brand, it follows 
Dominick’s lead on the Tuna Chunk light. 
 Table 6 demonstrates another interesting point. On average, the brands that hold 
Table 6 Average Statistics Classified by Equilibrium and Product Types. 
 
 
  
 
Average Market Share (%) 
 
Average Retailer Profit Margin (%) 
 
Manufacturer 
Stackelberg 
Retailer 
Stackelberg 
 
Manufacturer 
Stackelberg 
Retailer 
Stackelberg 
Beer 9.42 1.73 
 
12.29 21.22 
Cheese 16.55 1.20 
 
48.87 38.14 
Soft Drinks 3.56 3.91 
 
22.99 26.85 
Toilet Paper 7.26 2.32 
 
25.88 36.38 
Tuna 8.87 0.32 
 
41.83 38.54 
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the bigger market shares tend to elicit Manufacturer Stackelberg relationships. On the 
other hand, on average, the brands that provide the retailer with the bigger profit margin 
seem to elicit Retailer Stackelberg equilibriums. However, this observation needs to be 
considered with caution because the Retailer Stackelberg sample is very small. In 
particular, this category contains only one brand of beer and only one brand of toilet 
paper, while the tuna group is composed by only two brands (Appendix D). 
Interestingly, Dominick’s private labels are identified most of the times as Manufacturer 
Stackelbergs. These results are at odds with those of Cotterill and Putsis (2001) who 
studied a sample that covers the same time window. Their study concluded that 
Manufacturer Stackelbergs are more frequent for national brands while vertical Nash 
interactions are more common for private labels. However, our study would support 
Jørgensen et al. (2001) conclusion that Manufacturer Stackelbergs should be more 
frequent. His research discussed that Manufacturer Stackelbergs improve channel 
efficiency and consumer welfare, whereas a retailer leadership is not desirable in any of 
these terms. Moreover, the same study concluded that, although the retailer would be 
happy to assume the leadership within the channel, it would accept to be a follower in 
order to avoid participating in a vertical Nash. This conclusion was also reached by Lee 
and Staelin (1997) when increasing the profit margin comes as the best response to a 
supply chain member’s increase in margin.  
 This research is complemented with a study of the horizontal relationship among 
the manufacturers from the Beer, Cheese, Soft Drinks, Toilet Paper, and Tuna 
categories, as described in Section 4. In other words, we analyzed the causal relationship 
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among the suppliers of Dominicks and identified the price leaders. However, some of the 
manufacturers were dropped from this study to avoid spurious relationships. In 
particular, many of the suppliers were not studied because they provided their products 
during different time windows or very short periods of times. The complete results are 
presented in Appendix E whereas a discussion is provided below. 
 The causal patterns were estimated two times. Once with the Richardson’s 
algorithm, and the second time with the GES algorithm, both described in Appendix A 
and available through Tetrad IV (2005). Only those causal patterns common to both 
algorithms were retained and considered trustworthy. This is because the Richardson’s 
algorithm presented reversals of some causal relationships when the confidence level 
was changed. This problem is not uncommon. Scheines et al. (1994) discussed that such 
inconsistencies are usually explained by the omission of latent variables in the models, 
while Demiralp, Hoover, and Perez (2008) added that adherence to the causal sufficiency 
assumption implies that arrow reversals may be sign of simultaneous determination. 
Spirtes et al. (2000, pp 115) used simulations to study the reliability of several 
algorithms, including the PC. They concluded that the rates of arrow and undirected 
edges omissions are decreased dramatically as sample sizes are increased, up to 1000 
observations. Whereas the rates of arrow and undirected edges commissions are less 
sensitive to sample size, the frequency of the omissions and commissions will be 
affected by the statistical properties of the data. They suggest the use of high 
significance levels for small samples, and reduce the significance level as the sample 
increases.  
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  Demiralp and Hoover (2003) also used Monte Carlo simulations to study the 
reliability of the PC Algorithm, but this time to infer the causal pattern among 
contemporaneous disturbances, which is required to properly specify a SVAR. They 
concluded that the PC Algorithm  has well behaved statistical properties as long as the 
causal relationships are sufficiently strong (high signal-to-noise ratios). A downside of 
this study is that such Monte Carlo simulations are useful only if the data generation 
process is known, which is not common. In a subsequent study,  Demiralp et al. (2008) 
complemented the previous study by providing a methodology that used bootstrap 
simulations which do not rely on a known data generating process.  
  Bryant, Bessler, and Haigh (2009) reflected on these problems and proposed a 
different method to test whether a variable causes another one. Their methodology 
suggests that inclusion of all possible related variables is not required. Equally 
important, their methodology provides a way to assess whether a causal relationship was 
rejected with weak or strong support, further improving the reliability of the results. 
Moreover, such strong basis rejections provide a high degree of confidence without the 
requirement of big samples, as long as the causal relationship is strong.  
 We used a different approach in this research. Appendix E shows two graphs per 
group. Graph a is the Directed Cyclic Graph obtained with the use of the Richardson’s 
algorithm, while graph b shows only those edges and arrows that coincide with those 
obtained from the GES Algorithm (Meek, 1997; Chickering, 2002). Thus graph b is the 
one determined to be reliable and it is the one used in the following discussion. 
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 As before, the emphasis of this study is to identify the price leaders among each 
category. The marketing literature identifies two different firm types that would 
naturally seek for price leadership. The first one is when there is the existence of a 
dominant or more efficient firm (Markham, 1951). This scenario exists when a single 
firm’s choice of output can affect the market price because it supplies more than 40% of 
the market, leaving the residual demand to be satisfied by the rest of the industry which 
is characterized by one or more smaller firms that act as price takers. For this reason, the 
dominant firm choice of price is the one that equates its marginal benefits to its marginal 
costs. However, this market scenario has been deemed impractical with only a few 
industries that fit this model (Bain, 1960; Deneckere and Kovenock, 1992). 
 The second type of price leaders is the Barometric (Stigler, 1947). Barometric 
leaders are those firms that accurately study and interpret the market environment which 
results on a more precise determination of the equilibrium price. Such price is thereafter 
signaled and adopted by the rest of the industry because it is considered acceptable. This 
ability to study the economic environment is not exclusive to the dominant firms, and for 
this reason this leadership tends to shift if the price leader is no longer considered 
reliable. 
 Bain (1960) discussed that these two models are too simple. He explained that 
firms recognize the interdependence among competitors, which was considered by 
Deneckere and Kovenock’s (1992) game-theoretic model of dominant-firm price 
leadership, where the leadership is completely determined by the effects of capacity 
constraints in a Nash equilibrium. However, relaxation of their assumptions leads to 
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price leadership supported by brand loyalty or quality instead of size. Nevertheless, their 
model implies that price leadership yields more stable prices. The importance of price 
stability is also mentioned by Barney (2002, pp 357). Barney explains that price leaders 
are given by their ability to set a price that yields ―acceptable‖ profits to the industry, 
and to provide environments conducive to long lasting tacit collusions. Barney further 
explains that price leaders are generally regarded as Stackelberg leaders. 
 Our empirical study thus seeks for this type of leader in our results. Although we 
do not have cost information from any of the firms, Kadiyali et al. (2000) identified 
Chicken of the Sea (COS) as the most efficient firm among Bumble Bee and Starkist, 
being Starkist the firm with the highest costs among these three. Our results show that 
COS is indeed a price leader and Starkist a follower. Bumble Bee appears to be 
independent. Interestingly, COS leads over all the firms that hold the larger market 
shares, including Starkist which accounts for the most sales. 
 The Beer category presents similar results. The firm with the greatest market 
share is not the price leader. Although Miller holds 42% of the market, it appears 
independent from the industry. However, Old Style holds the second largest market 
share with 27% and leads Coors/Keystone and Foster’s, which have significantly lower 
market shares. Budweiser also is one of the big players with 17%, and our results 
indicate that this firm leads Beck’s which is significantly smaller. However, Budweiser 
is lead by Old Milwakee/Augsburguer which is even smaller than Beck’s. 
 The Cheese category paints a similar picture. Kraft is the dominant manufacturer 
with 60% of the market and yet it fails to be the market leader. In fact, it appears to 
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follow the prices set by Borden and Cty Ln. It is interesting to notice that the store label 
holds the second largest market share and appears independent from the industry’s 
pricing decisions. 
 More intuitive results can be found when looking at the Soft Drinks category. 
Coca-Cola and Pepsi, both with the largest shares in the market, seem to be pricing 
leaders, although they certainly do not lead the whole market. Interestingly, Dominick’s 
private label follows Pepsi’s lead. Intuitive results are also found in the Toilet Paper 
category. This is because the generic brand is clearly a market follower. Once again, the 
market leader, Kleenex, appears to be independent whereas Charmin, the second largest 
firm, leads the generic brand but follows the lead of Northern Quilted, which is the third 
largest firm. 
 These results lend support to the observation that price leadership is determined 
by strategic behavior and not by firm size. Indeed, the largest firms seem independent 
from the market pricing decisions, whereas the second largest firms tend to be engaged 
in price leaderships. Although this is not always the case as we saw in the Soft Drinks 
Category. These results also support the notion that more efficient firms tend to lead. We 
found the leadership pattern implied by the observations offered in Kadiyali et al. 
(2000). We also found that the private label never leads over other brands, yet it did lead 
the generic brand toilet paper. 
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5. 4 CASE STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
 We presented in Section 5 an application of the methodology discussed in 
Section 4. We used Directed Graphs to study the relationship between a retailer and 
several manufacturers who frequently provided more than one brand each. Our study 
may be affected by a large number of missing observations in the data. This problem 
was circumvented by aggregating those brands provided by the same manufacturer to 
create a representative product. Although we proved that aggregation should not affect 
our results when a manufacturer pursues the same marketing strategy for each of its 
brands, we found no strong evidence that manufacturers behave this way in our study. 
Moreover, the same aggregation implies strong restrictions on consumer behavior.  
 Nevertheless, our empirical analysis unambiguously determined causal patterns 
for 60% of our sample. Of these, 70% elicit Manufacturer Stackelberg relationships 
(qconsumer → pretailer ← pmanufacturer), 25% elicit Retailer Stackelbergs (qconsumer → 
pmanufacturer ← pretailer), and only 5% elicit a monopolistic retailer with vertical 
coordination (pretailer → qconsumer ← pmanufacturer). These results strongly agree with the 
market structure of the early 1990s and predictions from other researchers. In particular, 
Manufacturer Stackelberg relationships are more frequently assumed (Lee and Staelin 
1997; Jørgensen et al.  2001; Wang, 2002; Corbett et al., 2004). However, there are 
studies were the retailer is expected or found to lead the Stackelberg relationship (Choi, 
1991; Tsay, 2002; Ertek and Griffin, 2002). Interestingly, we found that the 
manufacturers that hold the bigger market shares tend to elicit Manufacturer Stackelberg 
relationships, whereas those manufacturers that provide the retailer with the bigger profit 
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margin seem to elicit Retailer Stackelberg equilibriums. Although our algorithms are 
incapable of simultaneous determination, McGuire and Staelin (1983, 1986), and 
Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989) showed that perfect coordination is not the best 
alternative for manufacturers of highly substitutable products. 
  We also studied the horizontal relationship among the manufacturers. The 
marketing literature explains that the firms that interpret the markets the best, the 
dominant firms, or the most efficient, are the firms that establish themselves as price 
leaders (Markham, 1951; Stigler; 1947). However, some authors explain that price 
leadership comes as a consequence of strategic behavior, which may be influenced by 
firm size, and are generally regarded as Stackelberg leaderships (Bain 1960; Deneckere 
and Kovenock, 1992; Barney, 2002, pp 357). Although we do not have any information 
about the cost structures of any of the manufacturers, or their ability to predict the 
market prices, we determined that the price leader in the tuna category is the same that 
Kiadiyali et al. (2000) determined to be the firm with the lowest costs. But our results 
indicate that the market leader in fact tends to be isolated from the pricing fluctuations. It 
is the second largest firm which tends to engage in price leadership. Finally, we 
discovered that the private label does not lead any firm’s decisions, unless this firm is 
the provider of a generic brand. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This research studies the use of causal inference models to elicit strategic 
behavior among competing firms. This is important because proper determination of a 
strategic relationship has been found to be essential for accurate modeling. For instance, 
Lee and Staelin (1997) concluded that even the specification of the demand in the 
structural models is not as important as determining the type of interaction present 
between the channel members. Moreover, the same study demonstrated how the choice 
of a firm’s optimal strategy is not constrained by the best response of the channel 
member, but by the actual response being observed. This is because of some firm’s 
tendency to behave sub optimally. Indeed, Dhar et al. (2005) assumed a fixed markup as 
the retailer strategy, but they also acknowledge that studies of this nature will be biased. 
 However, identification of such underlying strategic relationships is not trivial 
and usually relies on structural models which are very sensitive to misspecification. 
Moreover, models of strategic behavior are usually too complex to conduct large scale 
analyses. This dissertation thus explains how the usual Nash equilibriums imply 
different causal patterns and therefore can be elicited through models of causal 
inference. The result is a different way to elicit strategic relationships with the use of 
algorithms that are not sensitive to misspecification and can be programmed to conduct 
large scale analyses. 
 To meet our objectives, we analytically derived the Nash equilibriums that result 
from the Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg games in both horizontal  (manufacturer – 
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manufacturer) and vertical relationships (retailer – manufacturer), and related them to 
causal patterns. Given that firms’ profits depend on the decisions made by their 
competitors or supply chain members, they should study their competitors’ and partners’ 
prices and use this information to set their own prices or quantities (Slade, 1992; Lee and 
Staelin, 1997) . Therefore, these price signals can sometimes be considered as 
exogenously determined and for this reason as causal sources of information for the 
profit maximization process. 
 Thus, for the horizontal competition case, we concluded that the monopolist’s 
ability to determine supply, and therefore prices, allows him to manipulate consumption. 
Therefore, the following pattern should be elicited: qmonopoly → pmonopoly → qconsumer, 
where qmonopoly represents the monopolist output, and qconsumer represents the actual 
consumer’s choice of quantity. However, the consumer should always be a causal source 
of information whenever there is no monopolistic power; qconsmer → qj → pj, where qj 
and pj are firm j
th’s output and price in a competitive market. Firms engaged in a 
Cournot relationship should have a simultaneous determination of their supplies 
generating a bidirectional causal pattern, qi ↔ qj, whereas companies that participate in a 
Stackelberg game would generate an unidirectional causal pattern, where the Stackelberg 
leader is the source of the information: qStackelberg leader → qi. Finally, companies that take 
on Bertarnd competition should seem to be independent from each other. This is because 
their prices are determined by their own ability to reduce costs and lower the prices to 
those of a perfect competitive market. Nevertheless, superior monopolistic profits will 
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provide incentives for collusion. Successful cooperation should result in consumer 
manipulation by the participant firms in the oligopoly: qcollusion → pmonopoly  → qconsumer. 
 We also studied the causal patterns associated with perfect coordination of the 
supply chain, vertical Nash, Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and 
monopolistic power for vertical competition (competition within a supply chain). We 
concluded that the consumer should serve as a causal source for both the retailer’s and 
manufacturer’s price when there is vertical coordination, pretailer ← qconsumer → 
pmanufacturer, unless there exists monopolistic power, pretailer → qconsumer ← pmanufacturer.  
Different patterns should be observed whenever there is no vertical coordination. In 
particular, absence of coordination but presence of retailer’s monopolistic power should 
determine the retailer’s price as a causal source for both the consumers and 
manufacturers, qconsumer ← pretailer → pmanufacturer. Absence of both monopolistic power 
and perfect coordination would lead to either vertical Nash or Stackelberg games. The 
former implies simultaneous determination between the retailer and the manufacturer 
(when the retailer does not use a fixed mark up rule) while both are subject to the 
consumer choices, pretailer ↔ pmanufacturer  with pretailer ← qconsumer → pmanufacturer. The later 
implies that the Stackelberg leader will act as a causal source subject to the consumer’s 
choices. That is, the Manufacturer Stackelberg and the Retailer Stackelberg should be 
respectively elicited by qconsumer → pretailer ← pmanufacturer and qconsumer → pmanufacturer ← 
pretailer. 
 These conclusions indicate the need of a causal algorithm that allows for 
bidirectional causality. Therefore, Directed Cyclic Graphs (DCG) as opposed to Directed 
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Acyclic Graphs (DAG) was considered. For this purpose, we studied one DCG 
algorithm (Richardson, 1996) and two DAG algorithms, PC (Sprites et al., 1993) and 
Moneta’s (Moneta, 2008). Since these algorithms are almost equivalent when studying 
only three variables, truncated versions of each were programmed in Visual Basic as a 
spreadsheet macro and used to analyze the relationship between a retailer and its 
suppliers. Indeed, the different algorithms provided supporting results and contradicting 
each other only once out of the 93 relationships that were studied. 
 However, the dataset had multiple missing observations which were dealt with 
aggregation of all those brands which were provided by the same manufacturer. 
Although we proved that our results should not change under the assumption that the 
manufacturer-retailer relationship is independent and similar for each of the 
manufacturer’s brands, we have no evidence that this assumption is met. Cluster 
statistical methods can help to refine our analysis by grouping those brands that tend to 
act similarly, although it does not seem practical given the dimension of our study. 
Nevertheless, Day (1963) concluded that such type of aggregation should not mask the 
nature of the firm. Moreover, the same assumption places strong restrictions on the 
underlying consumer behavior. This is a persistent problem in consumer demand theory. 
Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) explained that in general, the micro and macro functional 
forms need not to be similar. These restrictions can be relaxed if the aggregate demand 
function is expected to be determined only by the shape each consumer’s Engel curve in 
the face of the same prices and a constant distribution of expenditures. 
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 Our results tend to agree with those of other researchers. In particular, we 
determined causality for 60% of our sample. This is a very high number considering the 
shortcomings in our dataset and the fact that our algorithms can only detect three out of 
the twenty five possible causal patterns that can be observed when only three variables 
are considered. Nevertheless, there is no ambiguity on those patterns that can be elicited. 
Namely we could only search for Stackelberg strategies and monopolistic activities with 
supply chain coordination. Our results indicate that 70% of those unambiguous causal 
patterns elicit Manufacturer Stackelberg relationships, 25% elicit Retailer Stackelbergs, 
and only 5% elicit a monopolistic retailer with vertical coordination. These results were 
expected because the market structure of the early 1990s was characterized by a highly 
fragmented retailed industry, enabling the manufacturers to lead the prices. Moreover, 
the convergence of the lack of private labels and the abundance of poorly developed 
products provided the manufacturers with incentives to pursue strategic avenues to 
increase profits. Furthermore, price leaderships should be frequent since they provide 
stability of prices (Barney, 2002 pp 357). Additionally, our results are also consistent in 
regards with the low presence of monopolistic activities and supply chain coordination. 
McGuire and Staelin (1983, 1986), and Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989) showed that 
perfect coordination is not the optimal strategy when considering highly elastic products. 
In particular, all of our categories pertain products from highly competitive markets.  
 Interestingly, our study classified Dominick’s private labels as Manufacturer 
Stackelbergs most of the times. However, Cotterill and Putsis (2001) argued that private 
labels tend to achieve Vertical Nash equilibriums. Nevertheless, the same study agrees 
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that the Manufacturer Stackelbergs should be more frequent for national brands. 
Moreover, Jørgensen et al.  (2001) concluded that retailer leadership is not desirable 
whereas Manufacturer Stackelbergs provide several advantages. They improve supply 
chain efficiency and consumer welfare. Furthermore, the Vertical Nash leads to a lower 
level of profits. Thus, Jørgensen et al. concluded that the retailer would benefit from 
becoming a price follower in order to avoid a Vertical game of simultaneous 
determination. This conclusion was also reached by Lee and Staelin (1997). 
 Our study of the horizontal relationships among the manufacturers leads to some 
interesting results as well. The marketing literature explains that the dominant firms, the 
most efficient, or those which have a superior ability to interpret the market conditions 
are the ones that assume price leadership (Markham, 1951; Stigler; 1947). However, 
some authors explain that price leadership comes as a consequence of strategic behavior 
which is generally regarded as Stackelberg leaderships (Bain 1960; Deneckere and 
Kovenock, 1992; Barney, 2002, pp 357). Our results indicate that the market leader in 
fact tends to be isolated from the pricing fluctuations while the second largest firm tends 
to engage in price leadership. Nevertheless, we successfully identified as a price leader 
the only company whose costs are known to be low through Kadiyali et al. (2000). 
Finally, we discovered that the private label does not lead any firm’s decisions, unless 
this company is the provider of a generic brand. 
 An immediate extension of this research would be to study a larger dataset that 
contains more than one retailer. A more complete dataset would enrich this research by 
avoiding the aggregation of brands that could lead to erroneous interpretations and likely 
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to a higher success ratio. It would be interesting as well to study brands marketed in 
different presentations. Moreover, knowledge of the private characteristics of each firm 
would enable us to explicitly test the ability of low cost firms, barometric leaders, and 
dominant companies to set the price.  
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APENDIX A  
ALGORITHMS 
 
 This Appendix presents the Algorithms used for this research. The customized 
algorithm used for this research is also presented. The algorithms provided below are 
adaptations from Scheines et al. (1994), Moneta (2007), and Richardson (1996). Letters 
in bold intend to emphasize the principal differences among them. These versions have 
been modified from their original notation to allow ease of comparison and agreement 
with the notation used throughout this dissertation. A brief description of the Greedy 
Equivalence Search algorithm (GES) algorithm is also offered. This algorithm lies 
outside of the scope of this dissertation and for this reason further details are referred to 
the original publications (Meek, 1997; Chickering, 2002). 
 
A.1 PC ALGORITHM  
 (A)  
Form the complete undirected graph C on the vertex set y1t , . . . , ykt. Let 
Adjacencies(C, yit ) be the set of vertices adjacent to yit in C; let GYt be the 
(unobservable) causal structure among the k elements of Yt; 
  
(B) 
n = 0 
Repeat : 
Repeat : 
select an ordered pairs of variables yht and yit that are adjacent in C 
such that Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } has cardinality greater than or 
equal to n, and a subset S of Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } of 
cardinality n, and if yht and yit are independent given S in GYt 
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delete edge yht — yit from C and record S in Sepset (yht , yit ) and 
Sepset (yit , yht ); 
until all ordered pairs of adjacent variables yht  and yit such that 
Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } has  cardinality greater than or equal to n and all 
subsets S of Adjacencies(C, yht ) \{yit } of cardinality n have been tested 
for independence; 
n = n + 1; 
until for each ordered pair of adjacent variables yht , yit , Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } 
is of cardinality less than n; 
  
(C) 
For each triple of vertices yht , yit , yjt such that the pair yht , yi t and the pair yit , yjt 
are each adjacent in C but the pair yht , yjt is not adjacent in C, orient yht — yit — y 
jt as yht → yit ← yjt if and only if yit is not in Sepset (yht, yjt ); 
  
(D) 
Repeat : 
if yat → ybt , ybt and yct are adjacent, yat and yct are not adjacent and ybt 
belongs to the Sepset (yat , yct), then orient ybt — yct as ybt → yct;  
if there is a directed path from yat to ybt , and an edge between yat and ybt , 
then orient yat — ybt as yat → ybt ;  
until no more edges can be oriented. 
 
A.2 MONETA 
(A)  
Form the complete undirected graph C on the vertex set y1t , . . . , ykt. Let 
Adjacencies(C, yit ) be the set of vertices adjacent to yit in C; let GYt be the 
(unobservable) causal structure among the k elements of Yt ; and let Sepset (yht , 
yit ) be the set of sets of vertices S so that yht and yit are d-separated given S in 
GYt . 
  
(B) 
n = 0 
Repeat : 
Repeat : 
select an ordered pairs of variables yht and yit that are adjacent in C 
such that Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } has cardinality greater than or 
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equal to n, and a subset S of Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } of 
cardinality n, and if yht and yit are d-separated given S in GYt delete 
edge yht — yit from C; 
until all ordered pairs of adjacent variables yht  and yit such that 
Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } has  cardinality greater than or equal to n and all 
subsets S of Adjacencies(C, yht ) \{yit } of cardinality n have been tested 
for d-separation; 
n = n + 1; 
until for each ordered pair of adjacent variables yht , yit , Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } 
is of cardinality less than n; 
  
(C) 
For each triple of vertices yht , yit , yjt such that the pair yht , yi t and the pair yit , yjt 
are each adjacent in C but the pair yht , yjt is not adjacent in C, orient yht — yit — y 
jt as yht → yit ← yjt if and only if yit does not belong to any set of Sepset (yht , yjt); 
  
(D) 
Repeat : 
if yat → ybt , ybt and yct are adjacent, yat and yct are not adjacent and ybt 
belongs to every set of Sepset (yat , yct), then orient ybt — yct as ybt → yct ;  
if there is a directed path from yat to ybt , and an edge between yat and ybt , 
then orient yat — ybt as yat → ybt ;  
until no more edges can be oriented. 
 
A.3 RICHARDSON 
(A)  
Form the complete undirected graph Partial Ancestral Graphs C on the vertex set 
y1t , . . . , ykt. Let Adjacencies(C, yit ) be the set of vertices adjacent to yit in C; let 
GYt be the (unobservable) causal structure among the k elements of Yt; 
  
(B) 
n = 0 
Repeat : 
Repeat : 
Select an ordered pairs of variables yht and yit that are adjacent in 
C such that Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } has cardinality greater than 
or equal to n, and a subset S of Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } of 
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cardinality n, and if yht and yit are independent given S in GYt 
delete edge yht °—° yit from C and record S in Sepset (yht , yit ) 
and Sepset (yit , yht ); 
until all ordered pairs of adjacent variables yht  and yit such that 
Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } has  cardinality greater than or equal to n and all 
subsets S of Adjacencies(C, yht ) \{yit } of cardinality n have been tested 
for independence; 
n = n + 1; 
until for each ordered pair of adjacent variables yht , yit , Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } 
is of cardinality less than n; 
  
(C) 
For each triple of vertices yht , yit , yjt such that the pair yht , yi t and the pair yit , yjt 
are each adjacent in C but the pair yht , yjt is not adjacent in C, orient yht *—* yit 
*—* y jt as yht → yit ← yjt if and only if yit is not in Sepset (yht, yjt ); Orient yht *—
* yit *—* y jt as yht *—* yit *—* y jt if and only if yit does belongs to the Sepset (yht, 
yjt ); 
 
(D) 
For each triple of vertices yht , yit , yjt such that (a) yht is not adjacent to yit or 
yjt,(b) yit and yjt are adjacent, (c) yit does not exist in the Sepset (yht, yjt), then 
orient yit *—* y jt as yit ← yjt if yht is independent of yit conditioned on Sepset 
(yht, yjt).  
 
(E) 
For each vertex V in C form the following set: yht exists in Local(C ,V) if and 
only if yht is adjacent to V in C, or there is a vertex yit s.t. yht → yit ← yjt in C. 
 
m=0 
Repeat: 
Repeat: 
Select an ordered triple < yht , yit , yjt > such that yht → yit ← yjt, 
yht and yjt are not adjacent, and |Local(C, yht)\{ yit, yjt}| ≥ m, and 
a set T which is a subset from Local(C, yht)\{ yit, yjt}, |T|=m, and 
if yht is independent of yjt conditioned on T or {yit}, then orient 
yht → yit ← yjt as yht → yit ← yjt, and record T or { yit } in 
Supset< yht , yit , yjt > 
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Until for all triplets such that yht → yit ← yjt, (not yht → yit ← yjt), yht 
and yjt are not adjacent, |Local(C, yht)\{ yit }| ≥ m, every subset T 
which is a subset from Local(C, yht), |T| = m has been considered. 
m=m+1 
Until for all ordered triplets < yht, yit, yjt > such that yht → yit ← yjt, yht and yjt 
not adjacent, yht and yjt are not adjacent, are such that |Local(C, yht)\{ yit }| < 
m. 
 
(F) 
If there is a quadruple < yht, yit, yjt, ykt > of distinct vertices in C such that (i) 
yht → yit ← yjt, (ii) yht → ykt ← yj or yht → ykt ← yj , (iii) yit and ykt are adjacent, 
then orient yit *—* ykt as yit → ykt in C if ykt does not exist in the Supset< yht, yit, 
yjt > 
Else orient as yit *—* ykt as yit *— ykt. 
 
(G) 
For each quadruple < yht, yit, yjt, ykt > in C of distinct vertices s.t. ykt is not 
adjacent to both yht and yjt, and yht → yit ← yjt, if yht is independent of ykt 
conditioned on Supset< yht, yit, yjt > union with < ykt >, then orient yit *—* ykt 
as yit →  ykt in C. 
  
 
A.4 GREEDY EQUIVALENCE SEARCH (GES) 
 The GES is a two step Algorithm that starts with a DAG representation with no 
edges. It then moves forward by adding edges which are scored through a Bayesian 
criterion. The algorithm stops when the Bayesian score can no longer be increased. 
Thus, in the first step, all the possible single edge additions are created. Then the 
resulting graphs are categorized by equivalence classes as defined by Chickering (2002), 
and scored with a Bayesian criterion. The equivalence class that scores the highest is 
retained whereas the others are discarded. There may be several graphs in the resulting 
equivalence group. Those edges that are common to each of these graphs, but elicit a 
different causal direction, will remain undirected. This is repeated until no edge 
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additions can increase the score. The second stage starts by deleting single edges from 
the graph that resulted from the previous stage. If these deletions increase the score, then 
the change is retained and the solution is found.  
 
A.5 ALGORITHM USED IN THIS DISSERTATION 
 The differences between the three previous algorithms are very subtle because 
we only used three variables. The PC and Moneta’s algorithms differ only on the sepset 
definition. More precisely, the Sepsets in PC are a subset of the Sepsets in Moneta’s. 
Richardson’s algorithm is truncated to step (D) if only three variables are considered, 
which is an extension of the PC Algorithm that allows the direction of single edges. 
Therefore, both Richardson’s algorithm and Moneta’s algorithm were used in this 
dissertation.  
 To ease programming, the algorithm implemented in this research starts by 
computing all the possible correlations and partial correlations and testing them for 
significance to generate a large matrix that contains all Moneta’s Sepsets. Then, the 
algorithm continues as Richardson’s but changes the Sepset definition and avoids step 
(D) if Moneta’s results are sought. The Algorithm is described below. 
(A)  
Form the complete undirected graph Partial Ancestral Graphs C on the vertex set 
y1t , . . . , ykt. Let Adjacencies(C, yit ) be the set of vertices adjacent to yit in C; let 
GYt be the (unobservable) causal structure among the k elements of Yt; 
 
(B) 
For all  pairs of vertices (yit, yjt), test unconditional and conditional correlations 
on all possible combinations of the remaining variables. Record results in a 
Matrix of Sepsets. 
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n = 0 
Repeat : 
Repeat : 
Select an ordered pairs of variables yht and yit that are adjacent in 
C such that Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } has cardinality greater than 
or equal to n, and a subset S of Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } of 
cardinality n, and if yht and yit are independent given S in GYt 
delete edge yht °—° yit; 
until all ordered pairs of adjacent variables yht  and yit such that 
Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } has  cardinality greater than or equal to n and all 
subsets S of Adjacencies(C, yht ) \{yit } of cardinality n have been tested 
for independence; 
n = n + 1; 
until for each ordered pair of adjacent variables yht , yit , Adjacencies(C, yht )\{yit } 
is of cardinality less than n; 
  
(C) 
For each triple of vertices yht , yit , yjt such that the pair yht , yi t and the pair yit , yjt 
are each adjacent in C but the pair yht , yjt is not adjacent in C, orient yht *—* yit 
*—* y jt as yht → yit ← yjt if and only if yit is not in Sepset (yht, yjt ) as defined by 
the PC Algorithm and stored in the Matrix of Sepsets, or as defined by 
Moneta and stored in the Matrix of Sepsets. 
 
(D) 
If the Moneta version of Sepsets is not being used, then for each triple of 
vertices yht , yit , yjt such that (a) yht is not adjacent to yit or yjt,(b) yit and yjt are 
adjacent, (c) yit does not exist in the Sepset (yht, yjt), then orient yit *—* y jt as yit 
← yjt if yht is independent of yit conditioned on Sepset (yht, yjt).  
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APPENDIX B  
LIST OF MANUFACTURERS AND CHARACTERISTIC PRODUCTS 
 
 This Appendix describes the manufacturers analyzed in this dissertation. The 
manufacturers are categorized by product type, and information is provided to describe 
their representative products, number of associated UPCs, and how many of these UPC’s 
had enough observations to be transformed into stationary series and analyzed. 
 
Table B.1 List of Manufacturers and Characteristic Products. 
Category/ 
Manufacturer Representative Products Number of UPCs Usable Series 
    BEER 
   m1 Budweiser/Michelob 88 15 
m4 Miller 100 31 
m6 
Augsburguer/Old 
Milwakee 36 4 
m7 Labatta 6 1 
m8 Molson 9 4 
m10 
Coors/Keystone/Blue 
Moon 49 7 
m11 Strohs 17 3 
m12 
Pilsner/Moosehead/Dos 
Equis 15 3 
m13 Heineken 8 4 
m14 Old Style 101 15 
m15 Corona 14 3 
m18 Beck's 11 5 
m20 Berghoff/Augsburguer 8 3 
m22 Samuel Adams 32 2 
m25 Goose Island Honkers 6 1 
m27 Oregon Brewery India 7 1 
    CHEESE 
   m1 Cty Ln Colby Mild 10 6 
m3 Lifeway's Farmer's C 2 1 
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Table B.1 Continued. 
  Category/ 
Manufacturer Representative Products Number of UPCs Usable Series 
    m4 Kraft Colby 1/3 Less 237 115
m9 Lol Cheddarella Chee 6 5 
m12 Dom Amer Chs Food Tw 59 41 
m14 Frigo Shred Ched 12 2 
m15 Laughing Cow/Bonbel 9 2 
m16 Lean N' Free /Alpine 8 5 
m17 Treasure Cave Square 4 2 
m18 Sargento Wafer Thin 55 31 
m19 Borden Lt Ln Chdr 19 5 
    SOFT DRINKS 
  m2 Old Town Nat Sltzer 42 3 
m3 Tetley Iced Tea W/Le 7 1 
m4 Pepsi-Cola Cans 141 81 
m5 Schwepps Tonic N/R 37 21 
m6 Canada Dry Ginger Al 40 26 
m7 Hawaiian Punch Gldn 9 6 
m8 Fruitopia Citrus Con 14 6 
m9 Royal Crown Cola 101 45 
m11 Ocean Spry 16 9 
m12 World Classics Cola 9 8 
m13 Dominick's Cola 3 Lt 51 40 
m14 Liptn Brew Wild Strw 27 17 
m15 PS 6 1 
m16 Nu Grape Soda Ppd 9 3 
m17 Crush Different Flavors 24 11 
m18 Country Time 16 12 
m19 Sunkist 21 14 
m21 Coca-Cola 143 87 
m22 New York Seltzer 24 1 
m23 Hawiian Punch Red 8p 12 7 
m24 
Hawaiian Punch /Sunny 
Delight 
17 11 
m26 Sundance Black Curra 24 1 
m27 Dr Pepper Sugar Free 25 11 
m28 Clearly Canadian 38 15 
m29 A & W Root Beer (Can 15 12 
m31 Boku 6 2 
m32 Vernors / Artic Twist 22 6 
m33 Barq's Root Beer 18 9 
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Table B.1 Continued. 
  Category/ 
Manufacturer Representative Products Number of UPCs Usable Series 
    m34 Dad's Root Beer Tria 19 11 
m35 Ibc Root Beer Trial 9 2 
m36 Holy Cow 12 1 
m37 Seagram's Ginger Ale 13 8 
m38 Lacroix Orange Miner 50 11 
m40 Perrier Berry Nr 15 1 
m41 C/G Reg Sprk Mineral 32 7 
m43 Snapple Peach Tea 61 38 
m44 Welch Grape 11 3 
m46 A W Cream Soda Reg 10 6 
m47 7-Up 36 24 
m51 Canfield Fruit Punch 115 19 
m53 Nestea 6pk Cans 12 5 
m56 Mistic 44 4 
    TOILET PAPER 
  m1 Angel Sft Bth Tissue 8 4 
m2 Kleenex Pp1.09 20 9 
m3 Charmin Bath Tissue 31 14 
m4 Dominick's 2ply Pr B 8 3 
m5 Northern Quilted Tis 19 13 
m6 Kleenex Cottonell Ba 33 19 
m7 Generic Bath Tissue 3 1 
    TUNA 
   m1 C O S  11 9 
m3 King Oscar Kipper Sn 9 7 
m4 Dom/Hh 9 5 
m5 Orleans Dom Med Deve 14 7 
m6 Booth Ezo Sardines I 5 3 
m8 C O S  29 17 
m9 Romanoff Iceland Lum 8 1 
m10 Reese Flat Anchovies 20 5 
m11 King Oscar Sardines 14 5 
m12 Romanoff Whitefish C 9 2 
m13 Pillar Rock Pink Sal 5 4 
m14 Polar Smoked Mussels 16 8 
m15 Star Kist Chunk Ligh 13 2 
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Table B.1 Continued. 
  Category/ 
Manufacturer Representative Products Number of UPCs Usable Series 
    m16 Starkist Solid White 25 13
m17 Bum Bee Oil Chk Lite 22 15 
m18 Snow's Chopped Clams 3 2 
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APPENDIX C  
LIST OF MANUFACTURERS EXCLUDED FROM THE ANALYSIS 
 
 This Appendix provides a list of those manufacturers whose series do not meet 
the minimum statistical requirements for this study such as number of observations and 
stationarity either in levels or achieved through transformations. Therefore, these 
manufacturers were excluded from the analysis. 
Table C.1 List of Manufacturers Excluded from the Analysis. 
Category/ 
Manufacturer Representative Products Manufacturer Representative Products 
    BEER 
   m2 Hook/Ballard m17 Warsteiner 
m3 Pabst/Hamms m20 Berghoff/Augsburguer 
m5 New Amsterdam m23 Tecate 
m8 Molson m24 Rogue 
m12 
Pilsner/Moosehead/Dos 
Equis m25 Goose Island Honkers 
m15 Corona m26 Shipyard Export Ale 
m16 
Cold Springs/Naked 
Aspen m27 Oregon Brewery India 
    CHEESE 
   m2 Kaukauna Ranch Balls m23 Maybud Gerard Brie T 
m3 Lifeway's Farmer's C m24 Friendship Farmers C 
m5 Hoffman Hot Pepper S m25 Manischewitz Red Hor 
m6 Migdalamer White Che m26 Swiss Knight Cheese 
m7 Mothers White Horser m27 Win Schuler Cheese B 
m8 Schneiders String C m28 Sorrento 16 Oz Mozza 
m10 Koshure Lite Muenste m29 
W.W Low Sodium 
Chees 
m11 Trad Cho Cho Chip Ck m30 Stella Mozzarella Sq 
m13 Dom /Generic m31 Cf  
m16 Lean N' Free /Alpine m32 Formagg Yellow Amer 
m17 Treasure Cave Square m33 Miller's Sl American 
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Table C.1 Continued. 
  
    Category/ 
Manufacturer Representative Products Manufacturer Representative Products 
    m20 Rondele-Sliced Frenc m34 Lc Shipper/Wedge-Com 
m21 County Line Indiv W m35 Kr Velveeta Loaf Lig 
m22 Dorman No Salt Swiss m36 Trad Cho Cho Chip Ck 
    SOFT DRINKS 
  m1 Orenzada, Lemoniada m31 Boku 
m5 Schwepps Tonic N/R m32 Vernors / Artic Twist 
m6 Canada Dry Ginger Al m36 Holy Cow 
m10 Old Tyme m39 Faygo 
m11 Ocean Spry m42 Poland Springs 
m15 PS m43 Snapple Peach Tea 
m17 Crush Different Flavors m45 Chapelle 
m18 Country Time m46 A W Cream Soda Reg 
m19 Sunkist m47 7-Up 
m20 Tropicana m48 Naturale 
m22 New York Seltzer m49 Everlast 
m23 Hawiian Punch Red 8p m50 Corr 
m24 Hawiian Punch/Sunny D m52 Penafield 
m25 Ruby Red / Squirt m54 Quest 
m26 Sundance Black Curra m55 Arizona Teas 
m28 Clearly Canadian m56 Mistic 
m30 Equator m57 
Arizona Assorted 
Flavors 
    TOILET PAPER 
  m2 Kleenex Pp1.09 m5 Northern Quilted Tis 
m3 Charmin Bath Tissue m6 Kleenex Cottonell Ba 
    TUNA 
   m2 Romanof Gldn Lumpfis m8 C O S  
m5 Orleans Dom Med Deve m9 Romanoff Iceland Lum 
m6 Booth Ezo Sardines I m10 Reese Flat Anchovies 
m7 Orleans Whole Oyster m13 Pillar Rock Pink Sal 
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APPENDIX D  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS (VERTICAL COMPETITION) 
 
 This appendix presents the results from the empirical case study. The results are 
organized by the type of causal structure found in each of the five studied categories; 
Beer, Cheese, Soft Drinks, Toilet Paper, and Tuna. Therefore, the following tables 
present all the possible causal relationships that can be obtained by the algorithms used 
in this research. Namely, all the possible colliders Pm→q←Pr, q→Pr←Pm, Pr→Pm←q, 
which are respectively associated with either monopolistic retailers with vertical 
coordination/integration, manufacturers as a Stackelberg leader, or Retailer as a 
Stackelberg leader. Finally, those causal relationships which were not identified are also 
presented. In all instances, a sample of each of the manufacturers’ representative 
products is indicated along with the profit margin that they provide to the retailer, which 
expressed as a percent of the manufacturers’ average revenues. The market share, and 
the average value of this share, is also presented for each of the manufacturers. 
 
  
1
2
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Table D.1  Pm→q←Pr : Monopolistic Retailer with Vertical Coordination/Integration. 
Category Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Margin 
(%) 
Market Share  
(%) Market 
Share Value  
 BEER 
      
 
m7 Labatt 16.20 0.03 0.05 
 
 
m9 Foster's 31.61 0.11 0.21 
 
 
 
 
    
CHEESE 
 
    
 
m12 Dom Amer Chs Food Tw 63.63 28.43 25.34 
 
       SOFT DRINKS 
     
 
– – – – – 
 
       TOILET PAPER 
     
 
– – – – – 
 
       TUNA 
      
 
– – – – – 
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Table D.2 q→Pr←Pm : Manufacturer as a Stackelberg Leader. 
 
Category Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Margin 
(%)  
Market Share  
(%) Market 
Share Value  
 BEER 
      
 
m1 Budweiser/Michelob 11.83 16.98 17.10 
 
 
m4 Miller 10.57 41.68 40.56 
 
 
m10 Coors/Keystone/Blue Moon 10.94 2.22 2.36 
 
 
m11 Strohs 14.61 1.12 0.89 
 
 
m13 Heineken 14.06 2.35 4.50 
 
 
m14 Old Style -0.61 26.46 20.96 
 
 
m18 Beck's 10.30 2.19 3.88 
 
 
m19 
Bass/Guinness/Harp/Red 
Stripe 
15.66 0.10 0.22 
 
 
m21 Pete's 22.51 0.05 0.08 
 
 
m22 Samuel Adams 13.04 1.10 1.85 
 
 
 
 
    
CHEESE  
    
 
m1 Cty Ln Colby Mild 55.75 0.95 1.29 
 
 
m4 Kraft Colby 1/3 Less 35.62 59.62 59.67 
 
 
m14 ~Frigo Shred Ched 53.31 0.20 0.25 
 
 
m18 Sargento Wafer Thin 50.82 5.42 8.26 
 
  
 
 
   
SOFT DRINKS 
 
 
   
 
m8 Fruitopia Citrus Con 43.56 0.02 0.04 
 
 
m9 Royal Crown Cola 15.23 9.09 8.42 
 
 
m12 World Classics Cola 28.42 0.17 0.13 
 
 
m13 Dominick's Cola 3 Lt 35.42 10.17 6.60 
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Table D.2 Continued. 
 
 
   
  
 
 
   
Category Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Margin 
(%)  
Market Share  
(%) Market 
Share Value  
 
 
m21 Coca-Cola N/R 13.10 28.63 29.10 
 
 
m27 Dr Pepper Sugar Free 9.05 1.78 1.94 
 
 
m29* A & W Root Beer (Can 17.99 0.85 0.85 
 
 
m33 Barq's Root Beer 14.31 0.40 0.41 
 
 
m34 Dad's Root Beer Tria 9.52 0.71 0.66 
 
 
m35 Ibc Root Beer Trial 30.94 0.05 0.10 
 
 
m37 Seagram's Ginger Ale 19.98 0.14 0.15 
 
 
m38 Lacroix Orange Miner 39.61 0.19 0.36 
 
 
m41 C/G Reg Sprk Mineral 29.21 0.06 0.14 
 
 
m51 Canfield Fruit Punch 18.71 1.15 0.97 
 
 
m53 Nestea 6pk Cans 19.76 0.05 0.09 
 
  
 
 
   
TOILET PAPER 
 
 
   
 
m1 Angel Sft Bth Tissue 21.38 6.22 4.96 
 
 
m4 Dominick's 2ply Pr B 30.39 8.30 7.68 
 
 
 
 
    
TUNA 
 
 
    
 
m1 C O S 32.28 5.43 4.79 
 
 
m3 King Oscar Kipper Sn 47.04 1.72 4.79 
 
 
m4 Dom/Hh 32.03 9.80 6.78 
 
 
m11 King Oscar Sardines 36.56 4.24 6.50 
 
 
m14 Polar Smoked Mussels 44.06 1.68 2.90 
 
 
m16 Starkist Solid White 32.67 28.00 25.48 
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Table D.2 Continued. 
 
 
   
  
 
 
   
Category Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Margin 
(%)  
Market Share  
(%) Market 
Share Value  
 
 
m17 Bum Bee Oil Chk Lite 32.52 19.90 17.70 
 
 
m18 Snow's Chopped Clams 77.50 0.22 0.27 
 
       Note. 
* Conflicting result: Each of the two algorithms elicit a different causal pattern. 
       
       
       
       
       
       Table D.3 Pr→Pm←q: Retailer as a Stackelberg Leader 
 
Category Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Margin 
(%)  
Market Share  
(%) Market 
Share Value  
 BEER 
 
 
    
 
m6 Augsburger/Old Milwaukee 21.22 1.73 1.68 
 
 
 
 
    
CHEESE  
    
 
m9** LOL Cheddarella Chee 42.28 0.98 0.89 
 
 
m15* Laughing Cow/Bonbel 45.41 0.23 0.48 
 
 
m19** Borden Lt Ln Chdr 26.71 2.40 2.05 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
  
1
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3 
Table D.3 Continued. 
 
 
   
  
 
 
   
Category Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Margin 
(%)  
Market Share  
(%) Market 
Share Value  
 SOFT DRINKS 
 
 
   
 
m2 Old Town Nat Sltzer 28.55 0.19 0.13 
 
 
m4 Pepsi-Cola Cans 14.29 26.22 27.66 
 
 
m7 Hawaiian Punch Gldn 36.33 0.13 0.15 
 
 
m14 Liptn Brew Wild Strw 19.00 0.67 0.98 
 
 
m16 Nu Grape Soda Ppd 25.92 0.06 0.06 
 
 
m40 Perrier Berry Nr 38.66 0.03 0.09 
 
 
m44 Welch Grape 25.23 0.10 0.09 
 
  
 
 
   
TOILET PAPER 
 
 
   
 
m7 Generic Bath Tissue 36.38 2.32 1.30 
 
 
 
 
    
TUNA 
 
 
    
 
m12 Romanoff Whitefish C 43.44 0.04 0.42 
 
 
m15 Star Kist Chunk Ligh 33.64 0.60 0.38 
 
       Note. 
 * This manufacturer had a one-edge structure:  Pr→Pm. 
** Moneta’s algorithm proved to be unreliable for these manufacturers. 
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Table D.4 Undirected Structures. 
   
Category Structure Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Margin 
(%)  
Market Share  
(%) Market 
Share Value  
BEER 
      
 
q – Pr – Pm m8 Molson 9.81 0.46 0.67 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m12 
Pilsner/Moosehead/Dos 
Equis 
13.69 0.43 0.67 
 
q – Pr – Pm m15 Corona 15.19 1.45 2.57 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m20 Berghoff/Augsburger 11.50 1.20 1.35 
 
q – Pr m25 Goose Island Honkers 25.99 0.10 0.17 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m27 Oregon Brewery India 11.36 0.07 0.11 
  
 
 
   
CHEESE 
 
 
   
 
Pr – Pm – q m13 Dom /Generic 44.78 0.34 0.21 
 
Pr – Pm m16 Lean N' Free /Alpine 60.70 0.18 0.26 
 
Pr – Pm m17 Treasure Cave Square 62.04 0.20 0.39 
  
 
 
   
SOFT DRINKS 
 
 
   
 
q – Pr – Pm m5 Schwepps Tonic N/R 18.28 1.29 1.44 
 
Pr – Pm – q m6 Canada Dry Ginger Al 30.74 2.20 2.12 
 
Pr – Pm m11 Ocean Spray Cranberr 50.06 0.03 0.08 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m17 Orange Crush 14.87 1.13 1.09 
 
Pr – Pm m18 Countrytime Lemonade 34.31 0.12 0.23 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m19 Sunkist Lemonade 22.17 1.88 1.64 
 
Pr – Pm m22 New York Sltzr Diet 34.45 0.01 0.02 
 
Pr – Pm m23 Hawiian Punch Red 8p 3.39 0.28 0.31 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m24 Ruby Red/Squirt 17.03 0.75 0.83 
  
1
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Table D.4 Continued. 
 
 
   
  
 
 
   
Category Structure Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Margin 
(%)  
Market Share  
(%) Market 
Share Value  
 
q – Pr – Pm m26 Sundance Black Curra 36.05 0.01 0.03 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m28 Clearly Canadian Bla 34.76 0.09 0.33 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m32 Vernors Diet 17.50 0.15 0.17 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m43 Snapple Peach Tea 31.78 0.57 1.29 
 
Pr – Pm m46 A W Cream Soda Reg 26.57 0.19 0.18 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m47 Seven-Up Diet 20.37 10.35 10.98 
 
q – Pr m49 Everlast Mixed Berry 23.16 0.01 0.02 
 
Pr – Pm m56 Mistic Breeze Grape/ 44.99 0.02 0.04 
  
 
 
   
TOILET PAPER 
 
 
   
 
q – Pr – Pm m2 Kleenex Pp1.09 16.88 5.73 6.77 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m3 Charmin Bath Tissue 14.98 28.10 26.21 
 
Pm – q – Pr m5 Northern Quilted Tis 12.64 17.52 15.84 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m6 Kleenex Cottonell Ba 12.68 31.81 37.25 
  
 
 
   
TUNA 
 
 
 
   
 
Pr – Pm m5 Orleans Dom Med Deve 34.95 0.41 1.09 
 
q  Pr – Pm – q m6 Booth Ezo Sardines I 51.03 0.87 1.14 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m8 C O S 36.92 19.15 16.90 
 
q  Pr  Pm m9 Romanoff Iceland Lum 43.80 0.01 0.14 
 
q – Pr – Pm  q m13 Pillar Rock Pink Sal 36.38 7.22 8.39 
 
q – Pr – Pm – q m10 Reese Flat Anchovies 41.35 0.71 2.31 
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APPENDIX E  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS RESULTS (HORIZONTAL COMPETITION) 
 
 The following pages show the results from the empirical analysis of the 
horizontal competition among the manufacturers. Each category contains two graphs. In 
all instances graph a) is obtained with the use of the CCD algorithm. This causal 
structure is compared with one obtained from the GES algorithm. Those edges that are 
common in both causal structures are shown in graph b), which are the ones considered 
as reliable. The representative products for each manufacturer are presented in all 
instances, along with their market share and their market share value, both expressed as 
percents. 
  
1
3
7
 
Figure E.1 Causal Relationships among Manufacturers in the Beer Category. 
 
 
 
a) Causality at  = 5% 
 
 
 
b) Reliable causal structure 
 
 
Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Market Share  
(%) Market 
 Share Value  
m1 Budweiser/Michelob 16.98 17.1 
m4 Miller 41.68 40.56 
m6 Augsburguer/Old Milwakee 1.73 1.68 
m8 Molson 0.46 0.67 
m9 Foster's 0.11 0.21 
m10 Coors/Keystone/Blue Moon 2.22 2.36 
m11 Strohs 1.12 0.89 
m12 Pilsner/Moosehead/Dos Equis 0.43 0.67 
m13 Heineken 2.35 4.5 
m14 Old Style 26.46 20.96 
m15 Corona 1.45 2.57 
m18 Beck's 2.19 3.88 
m20 Berghoff/Augsburguer 1.2 1.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Sample size: 146 observations. 
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Figure E.2 Causal Relationships among Manufacturers in the Cheese Category. 
 
  
 
a) Causality at  = 10% 
 
  
 
b) Reliable causal structure 
 
 
Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Market Share  
(%) Market  
Share Value  
m1 Cty Ln Colby Mild 0.95 1.29 
m3 Lifeway's Farmer's C 1.03 0.87 
m4 Kraft Colby 1/3 Less 59.62 59.67 
m9 Lol Cheddarella Chee 0.98 0.89 
m12 Dom Amer Chs Food Tw 28.43 25.34 
m13 Dom /Generic 0.34 0.21 
m15 Laughing Cow/Bonbel 0.23 0.48 
m17 Treasure Cave Square 0.2 0.39 
m18 Sargento Wafer Thin 5.42 8.26 
m19 Borden Lt Ln Chdr 2.4 2.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Sample size: 90 observations. 
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Figure E.3 Causal Relationships among Manufacturers in the Soft Drinks Category. 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Causality at  = 5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) Reliable causal structure 
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Figure E.3     Continued. 
Manufacturer Representative Products (%) Market Share  (%) Market Share Value  
m4 Pepsi-Cola Cans 26.22 27.66 
m5 Schwepps Tonic N/R 1.29 1.44 
m6 Canada Dry Ginger Al 2.2 2.12 
m9 Royal Crown Cola 9.09 8.42 
m13 Dominick's Cola 3 Lt 10.17 6.6 
m14 Liptn Brew Wild Strw 0.67 0.98 
m17 Crush Different Flavors 1.13 1.09 
m19 Sunkist 1.88 1.64 
m21 Coca-Cola N/R 28.63 29.1 
m24 Hawaiian Punch /Sunny 
Delight 
0.75 0.83 
m27 Dr Pepper Sugar Free 1.78 1.94 
m29 A & W Root Beer (Can 0.85 0.85 
m32 Vernors / Artic Twist 0.15 0.17 
m33 Barq's Root Beer 0.4 0.41 
m34 Dad's Root Beer Tria 0.71 0.66 
m46 A W Cream Soda Reg 0.19 0.18 
m47 7-Up 10.35 10.98 
m51 Canfield Fruit Punch 1.15 0.97 
    
 
Note. Sample size: 336 observations. 
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Figure E.4 Causal Relationships among Manufacturers in the Toilet Paper Category. 
 
  
 
a) Causality at  = 1% 
 
    
 
b) Reliable causal structure 
 
 
Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Market Share  
(%) Market 
 Share Value  
m1 Angel Sft Bth Tissue 6.22 4.96 
m2 Kleenex Pp1.09 5.73 6.77 
m3 Charmin Bath Tissue 28.1 26.21 
m4 Dominick's 2ply Pr B 8.3 7.68 
m5 Northern Quilted Tis 17.52 15.84 
m6 Kleenex Cottonell Ba 31.81 37.25 
m7 Generic Bath Tissue 2.32 1.3 
 
Note. Sample size: 158 observations. 
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Figure E.5 Causal Relationships among Manufacturers in the Tuna Category. 
 
 
 
a) Causality at  = 5% 
 
 
 
b) Reliable causal structure 
 
Manufacturer Representative Products 
(%) 
Market Share  
(%) Market 
 Share Value  
m1 C O S  5.43 4.79 
m3 King Oscar Kipper Sn 1.72 4.79 
m4 Dom/Hh 9.8 6.78 
m6 Booth Ezo Sardines I 0.87 1.14 
m10 Reese Flat Anchovies 0.71 2.31 
m11 King Oscar Sardines 4.24 6.5 
m12 Romanoff Whitefish C 0.04 0.42 
m13 Pillar Rock Pink Sal 7.22 8.39 
m14 Polar Smoked Mussels 1.68 2.9 
m16 Starkist Solid White 28 25.48 
m17 Bum Bee Oil Chk Lite 19.9 17.7 
 
  
Note. Sample size: 86 observations. 
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